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H. E. BARKER dncolniana
1714 WD0TMOnBfo«>»<»-B€)ULEVAnP
Los Angeles, California
*♦* Q
LIBERTY***
^
John Stuart Ilill
Noah E rooks cherished a personal and intimate acquaintance v/ith Abra- ham Lincoln, paying him frequent vis- its at the \7hite House^ and among the subjects discussed was that of books.
The follov/ing paragraph from an article by Brooks, in Harper's Maga- zine for July, 1865, includes this book by John Stuart Mill;
"But he also v^as a lover of many philosophical books, and particularly liked Putler's Analogy of Religion, Jolm Stuart Mill on Liberty, and he al- ways hoped to get at President Edv<-ards on the Will."
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Digitized by the Internet Arcliive
in 2010 witli funding from
The Institute of Museum and Library Services through an Indiana State Library LSTA Grant
http://www.archive.org/details/onlibertyOOinmill
ON
LIBERTY
BY
JOHN STUAET MILL.
THIRD EDITION.
LONDON: LONGMAN, GEEEN, LONGMAN, ROBERTS & GREEN.
M.DCCC.LXIV.
32-3 //4\M 4^-/5 o\. I<^^^
\The right of Translation is reserved.^
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGB INTEODUCTOEY r . 7
CHAPTER II.
OF THE LIBEETT OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION . . 31
CHAPTER III.
OF INDIVIDUALITY, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF
WELL-BEING 99
CHAPTER IV.
OF THE LIMITS TO THE AUTHORITY OF SOCIETY OVER
THE INDIVIDUAL 134
CHAPTER V.
APPLICATIONS 168
a2
The grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity. — Wilhelm VON Humboldt : Sphere and Duties oj Government.
nnO the beloved and deplored memory of her who was the inspirer, and in . part the author, of all that is best in my writings — the friend and wife whose exalted sense of truth and right was my strongest incitement, and whose approbation was my chief reward — I dedicate this volume. Like all that I have written for many years, it belongs as much to her as to me ; but the work as it stands has had, in a very insuf- ficient degree, the inestimable advantage of her revision; some of the most important portions having been reserved for a more careful re -examination, which they are now
6
never destined to receive. Were I but capable of interpreting to the world one half the great thoughts and noble feelings which are buried in her grave, I should be the medium of a greater benefit to it, than is ever likely to arise from anything that I can write, unprompted and unassisted by her all but unrivalled wisdom.
ON LIBERTY.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY.
THE subject of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Neces- sity ; but Civil, or Social Liberty : the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately ex- ercised by society over the individual. A question seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which profoundly influences the practi- cal controversies of the age by its latent presence, and is likely soon to make itself recognised as the vital question of the future. It is so far from being new, that, in a certain sense, it has divided mankind, almost from the remotest ages ; but in the stage of progress into which the more civiUzed portions of the species have now entered, it pre- sents itself under new conditions, and requires a different and more fundamental treatment.
The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of
8 INTRODUCTOBY.
history witli whicli we are earliest familiar, parti- cularly in that of Greece, Eome, and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the Government. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. The rulers were conceived (except in some of the popular govern- ments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled. They consisted of a governing One, or a governing tribe or caste, who derived their authority from in- heritance or conquest, who, at all events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and whose supremacy men did not venture, perhaps did not desire, to contest, whatever precautions might be taken against its oppressive exercise. Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dan- gerous ; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker mem- bers of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against his beak and claws. The aim, therefore, of patriots was to set limits to the power
INTRODUCTORY. 9
which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community ; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable. A second, and generally a later ex- pedient, was the establishment of constitutional checks, by which the consent of the community, or of a body of some sort, supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power. To the first of these modes of limitation, the ruling power, in most European countries, was compelled, more or less, to submit. It was not so with the second ; and, to attain this, or when already in some degree possessed, to attain it more com- pletely, became everywhere the principal object of the lovers of liberty. And so long as mankind were content to combat one enemy by another, and to be ruled by a master, on condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously against his tyranny, they did not carry their aspirations beyond this point.
A time, however, came, in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an indepen-
10 INTRODUCTORY.
dent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In that way alone, it seemed, could they have complete security that the powers of government would never be abused to their disadvantage. By degrees this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, wherever any such party existed ; and superseded, to a considerable extent, the pre- vious efforts to limit the power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded for making the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled, some persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limitation of the power itself. That (it might seem) was a resource against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the people. What was now wanted was, that the rulers should be identified with the people ; that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation. The nation did not need to be protected against its own will. There was no fear of its tyrannizing over itself. Let the rulers be effectually respon- sible to it, promptly removable by it, and it could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made. Their power was but the nation's own power, concentrated, and
INTRODUCTORY. 11
in a form convenient for exercise. This mode of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last generation of European liberalism, in the Continental section of which it still appa- rently predominates. Those who admit any limit to what a government may do, except in the case of such governments as they think ought not to exist, stand out as brilliant exceptions among the political thinkers of the Continent. A similar tone of sentiment might by this time have been preva- lent in our own country, if the circumstances which for a time encouraged it, had continued unaltered.
But, in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and in- firmities which failure might have concealed from observation. The notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over themselves, might seem ^axiomatic, when popular government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such tem- porary aberrations as those of the French Revolu- tion, the worst of which were the work of an usurping few, and which, in any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular institu- tions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a democratic republic came to
1 2 INTRODUCTORY.
occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and made itself felt as one of the most powerful mem- bers of the community of nations ; and elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrases as ' self-government/ and ' the power of the people over themselves/ do not express the true state of the case. The 'people' who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised ; and the ' self- government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active jpart of the people ; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority ; the people, consequently, inay desire to oppress a part of their number ; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of its im- portance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. This view of things, re- commending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important classes in European society to whose real or sup- posed interests democracy is adverse, has had no
INTRODUCTORY. 13
difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations 'the tyranny of the majority' is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant — society collec- tively, over the separate individuals who compose it — its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its poli- tical functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates : and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul it- self. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough : there needs pro- tection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penal- ties, its own ideas and practices as rules of con- duct on those who dissent from them ; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the
14 INTRODUCTORY.
formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence : and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.
But though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question, where to place the limit — how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control — is a subject on which nearly every- thing remains to be done. All that makes exis- tence valuable to any one, depends on the enforce- ment of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. What these rules should be, is the prin- cipal question in human affairs ; but if we except a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which least progress has been made in resolving. No two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike ; and the decision of one age or country is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given age and country no more suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been agreed. The rules
INTRODUCTORY. 15
which obtain among themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This all but uni- versal illusion is one of the examples of the magical influence of custom, which is not only, as the pro- verb says, a second nature, but is continually mistaken for the first. The effect of custom, in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on one another, is all the more complete because the subject is one on which it is not generally considered necessary that reasons should be given, either by one person to others, or by each to himself. People are accus- tomed to believe, and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking ; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not sup- ported by reasons, can only count as one person's preference ; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people's liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own
14
INTRODUCTORY.
!
IVv
formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence : and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.
But though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question, where to place the limit — how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control — is a subject on which nearly every- thing remains to be done. All that makes exis- tence valuable to any one, depends on the enforce- ment of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. What these rules should be, is the prin- cipal question in human affairs ; but if we except a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which least progress has been made in resolving. No two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike ; and the decision of one age or country is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given age and country no more suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been agreed. The rules
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INTRODUCTOKY.
15
wliich obtain among themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This all but uni- versal illusion is one of the examples of the magical influence of custom, which is not only, as the pro- verb says, a second nature, but is continually mistaken for the first. The effect of custom, in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on one another, is all the more complete because the subject is one on which it is not generally considered necessary that reasons should be given, either by one person to others, or by each to himself. People are accus- tomed to believe, and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking ; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not sup- ported by reasons, can only count as one person's preference ; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people's liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own
16 INTRODUCTORT.
preference, thus supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason, but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written in his religious creed ; and his chief guide in the inter- pretation even of that. Men's opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blameable, are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes their reason — at other times their prejudices or superstitions : often their social affections, not sel- dom their antisocial ones, their envy or jealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousness : but most commonly, their desires or fears for themselves — their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest. Wher- ever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class interests, and its feelings of class superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots,between planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between nobles and roturiers, between men and women, has been for the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings : and the senti- ments thus generated, react in turn upon the moral feelings of the members of the ascendant class, in their relations among themselves. Where, on the other hand, a class, formerly ascendant, has lost
INTRODUCTORY. 17
its ascendancy, or where its ascendancy is unpopu- lar, the prevailing moral sentiments frequently bear the impress of an impatient dislike of superi- ority. Another grand determining principle of the rules of conduct, both in act and forbearance, which have been enforced by law or opinion, has been the servility of mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions of their temporal masters, or of their gods. This servility, though essentially selfish, is not hypocrisy ; it gives rise to perfectly genuine sentiments of abhorrence ; it made men burn magicians and heretics. Among so many baser influences, the general and obvious interests of society have of course had a share, and a large one, in the direction of the moral sentiments : less, however, as a matter of reason, and on their own account, than as a consequence of the sympathies and antipathies which grew out of them : and sympathies and antipathies which had little or nothing to do with the interests of society, have made themselves felt in the estabhshment of moralities with quite as great force.
The likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion. And in general, those who have been in advance of society in thought and feeliDg, have left this condition of things unassailgd in
B
18 INTRODUCTORY.
principle, however they may have come into con- flict with it in some of its details. They have occupied themselves rather in inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. They preferred endeavour- ing to alter tlie feelings of mankind on the parti- cular points on which they were themselves here- tical, rather than make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally. The only case in which the higher ground has been taken on principle and maintained with consistency, by any but an individual here and there, is that of religious beUef : a case instructive in many ways, and- not least so as forming a most striking instance of the fallibility of what is called the moral sense : for the odium theologicum, in a sincere bigot, is one of the most unequivocal cases of moral feeling. Those who first broke the yoke of what called itself the Universal Church, were in general as little willing to permit difference of religious opinion as that church itself. But when the heat of the conflict was over, without giving a complete victory to any party, and each church or sect was reduced to Hmit its hopes to retaining possession of the ground it already occupied ; minorities, seeing that they had no chance of becoming majorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom they could not convert, for permission to differ. It is accord-
INTRODUCTORT. 19
ingly on this battle field, almost solely, tliat the rights of the individual against society have been asserted on broad grounds of principle, and the claim of society to exercise authority over dissen- tients, openly controverted. The great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it pos- sesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for his reli- gious belief. Yet so natural to mankind is intole- rance in whatever they really care about, that reli- gious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the minds of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves. One person will bear with dissent in matters of church government, but not of dogma; another can tolerate everybody, short of a Papist or an Unitarian ; another, every one who believes in revealed religion; a few extend their charity a little further, but stop at the belief in a God and in a future state. Wher- ^ ever the sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is found to have abated little of its claim to be obeyed.
In England, from the peculiar circumstances of our political history, though the yoke of opinion is b2
20 INTRODUCTORY.
perhaps heavier, that of law is lighter, than in most other countries of Europe ; and there is con- siderable jealousy of direct interference, by the legislative or the executive power, with private conduct ; not so much from any just regard for the independence of the individual, as from the still subsisting habit of looking on the government as representing an opposite interest to the public. The majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of the government their power, or its opinions their opinions. When they do so, individual liberty will probably be as much exposed to inva- sion from the government, as it already is from public opmion. But, as yet, there is a considerable amount of feeling ready to be called forth against any attempt of the law to control individuals in things in which they have not hitherto been accus- tomed to be controlled by it ; and this with very little discrimination as to whether the matter is, or is not, within the legitimate sphere of legal control ; insomuch that the feeling, highly salutary on the whole, is perhaps quite as often misplaced as well grounded in the particular instances of its applica- tion. There is, in fact, no recognised principle by which the propriety or impropriety of government interference is customarily tested. People decide according to their personal preferences. Some, whenever they see any good to be done, or evil to be remedied, would willingly instigate the govern-
INTRODUCTORY. 21
ment to undertake the business ; while others prefer to bear almost any amount of social evil, rather than add one to the departments of human inter- ests amenable to governmental control. And men range themselves on one or the other side in any particular case, according to this general direction of their sentiments ; or according to the degree of interest which they feel in the particular thing which it is proposed that the government should do, or according to the belief they entertain that the government would, or would not, do it in the manner they prefer ; but very rarely on account of any opinion to which they consistently adhere, as to what things are fit to be done by a govern- ment. And it seems to me that in consequence of this absence of rule or principle, one side is at present as often wrong as the other ; the inter- ference of government is, with about equal fre- quency, improperly invoked and improperly con- demned.
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penal- ties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collec- tively, in interfering with the liberty of action
;i i
22
INTRODUCTORY.
I
i
of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be right- fully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely con- cerns himself, his independence is, of right, abso- lute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. "We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be pro-
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INTRODUCTORY.
23
• '.0 ■ Id
tected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them ; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obe- dience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persua- sion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), com- pulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others. It is proper to state that I forego any advantage
22 INTRODUCTORY.
of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be right- fully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely con- cerns himself, his independence is, of right, abso- lute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be pro-
INTRODUCTORY. 23
tected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of sjjontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them ; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obe- dience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persua- sion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), com- pulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others. It is proper to state that I forego any advantage
24 INTRODUCTORY.
which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions ; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of in- dividual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people. If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapproba- tion. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform ; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice ; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection ; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow- creature's life, or interposing to protect the de- fenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may right- fully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much more
INTRODUCTORY. 25
cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule ; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that excep- tion. In all things which regard the external relations of the individual, he is de jure amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as their protector. There are often good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility ; but these reasons must arise from the special expediencies of the case : either be- cause it is a kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which society have it in their power to control him ; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce other evils, greater than those which it w^ould prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgment seat, and protect those interests of others which have no external protec- tion ; judging himself all the more rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made account- able to the judgment of his fellow-creatures.
But there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any,
26 INTRODUCTORY.
only an indirect interest ; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance : for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself; and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency, will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness ; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense ; li- berty of thought and feeling ; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an indivi- dual which concerns other people ; but, being al- most of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits ; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character ; of doing as we like, sub- ject to such consequences as may follow : without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though
INTRODUCTORY. 27
they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each indivi- dual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals ; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others : the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.
No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government ; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unquali- fied. The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.
Though this doctrine is anything but new, and, to some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and prac- tice. Society has expended fully as much effort in the attempt (according to its lights) to compel people to conform to its notions of personal, as of social excellence. The ancient commonwealths thought themselves entitled to practise, and the ancient
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28 INTRODUCTORY.
philosopliers countenanced, the regulation of every part of pri\'ute conduct by public authority, on the ground that the State had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its citizens ; a mode of thinking which may have been admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of being subverted by foreigu attack or internal com- motion, and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects of free- dom. In the modern world, the greater size of political communities, and above all, the separa- tion between spiritual and temporal authority (which placed the direction of men's consciences in other hands than those which controlled their worldly affairs), prevented so great an in- terference by law in the details of private life ; but the engines of moral repression have been wielded more strenuously against divergence from the reigning opinion in self-regarding, than even in social matters ; religion, the most powerful of the elements which have entered into the forma- tion of moral feeling, having almost always been governed either by the ambition of a hierarchy, seeking control over every department of human conduct, or by the spirit of Puritanism. And some of those modern reformers who have placed them-
INTRODUCTORY. 29;
selves in strongest opposition to the religions of the past, have been noway behind either churches or sects in their assertion of the right of spiritual domination : M. Comte, in particular, whose social system, as unfolded in his Systeme de Politique Positive, aims at establishing (though by moral more than by legal appliances) a despotism of society over the individual, surpassing anything contemplated in the political ideal of the most rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philoso- phers.
Apart from the peculiar tenets of individual thinkers, there is also in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation : and as the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish the power of the individual, this en- croachment is not one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and more formidable. The dispo- sition of mankind,, whether as rulers or as fellow- citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclina- tions as a rule of conduct on others, is so ener- getically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power ; and as the power
30 OF THE LIBERTY OF
is not declining, but growing, unless a strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must expect, in the present cir- cumstances of the world, to see it increase.
It will be convenient for the argument, if, in- stead of at once entering upon the general thesis, we confine ourselves in the first instance to a single branch of it, on which the principle here stated is, if not fully, yet to a certain point, re- cognised by the current opinions. This one branch is the Liberty of Thought : from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and of writing. Although these liberties, to some considerable amount, form part of the political morality of all countries which profess religious toleration and free institutions, the grounds, both philosophical and practical, on which they rest, are perhaps not so familiar to the general mind, nor so thoroughly appreciated by many even of the leaders of opinion, as might have been expected. Those grounds, when rightly understood; are of much wider application than to only one division of the subject, and a thorough consideration of this part of the question will be found the best introduction to the remainder. Those to whom nothing which I am about to say will be new, may therefore, I hope, excuse me, if on a subject which for now three centuries has been so often discussed, I venture on one discus- sion more.
THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION. 31
CHAPTER II.
OF THE LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION.
THE time, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be necessary of the ' liberty of the press' as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear. This aspect of the ques- tion, besides, has been so often and so triumphantly enforced by preceding writers, that it needs not be specially insisted on in this place. Though the law of England, on the subject of the press, is as servile to this day as it was in the time of the Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force against political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when fear of in- surrection drives ministers and judges from their propriety ;* and, speaking generally, it is not, in
* These words had scarcely been written, when, as if to give them an emphatic contradiction, occurred the Government Press Prosecutions of 1858. That ill-judged interference with the liberty of public discussion has not, however, induced me to alter
32 OF THE LIBERTY OF
constitutional countries, to be apprehended, that the government, whether completely responsible to the people or not, will often attempt to control the expression of opinion, except when in doing so it makes itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public. Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and
a single word in the text, nor has it at all weakened my convic- tion that, moments of panic excepted, the era of pains and penalties for political discussion has, in our own country, passed away. For, in the first place, the prosecutions were not per- sisted in ; and, in the second, they were never, properly speak- ing, political prosecutions. The offence charged was not that of criticising institutions, or the acts or persons of rulers, but of circulating what was deemed an immoral doctrine, the lawfulness of Tyrannicide.
If the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity, there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discuss- ing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered. It would, therefore, be irrelevant and out of place to examine here, whether the doctrine of Tyran- nicide deserves that title. I shall content myself with saying that the subject has been at all times one of the open questions of morals ; that the act of a private citizen in striking down a criminal, who, by raising himself above the law, has placed him- elf beyond the reach of legal punishment or control, has been accounted by whole nations, and by some of the best and wisest of men, not a crime, but an act of exalted virtue ; and that, right or wrong, it is not of the nature of assassination, but of civil war. As such, I hold that the instigation to it, in a specific case, may be a proper subject of punishment, but only if an overt act has followed, and at least a probable connexion can be established between the act and the instigation. Even then, it is not a foreign government, but the very government assailed, which alone, in the. exercise of self-defence, can legitimately punish attacks directed against its own existence.
THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION. 33
never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner ; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation ; those v^ho dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth : if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a bene- fit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision wuth error.
It is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch of C
M OF THE LIBERTY OF
the argument corresponding to it. We can never be sure that the opioion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion ; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.
First: the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth ; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certaiuty. All silencing of discussion is an assump- tion of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common.
Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying the weight in their practical judgment, which is always allowed to it in theory ; for while every one well knows himself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any opinion, of which they feel very certain, may be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowledge them- selves to be liable. Absolute princes, or others who are accustomed to unlimited deference, usually
THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION. 35
feel this complete confidence in their own opinions on nearly all subjects. People more happily situated, who sometimes hear their opinions disputed, and are not wholly unused to be set right when they are wrong, place the same unbounded reliance only on such of their opinions as are shared by all who surround them, or to whom they habitually defer : for in proportion to a man's want of confidence in his own solitary judgment, does he usually repose, with implicit trust, on the infallibility of *the world ' in general. And the world, to each indi- vidual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact ; his party, his sect, his church, his class of society : the man may be called, by comparison, almost liberal and large-minded to whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age. Nor is his faith in this collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that other ages, countries, sects, churches, classes, and parties have thought, and even now think, the exact reverse. He devolves upon his own world the responsibility of being in the right against the dis- sentient worlds of other people; and it never troubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make him a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Pekin. Yet it is as evident in itself, as any amount of argument can e2
86 OF THE LIBERTY OF
make it, that ages are no more infallible than individuals ; every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd ; and it is as certain that many opinions, now general, will be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.
The objection likely to be made to this argu- ment, would probably take some such form as the following. There is no greater assumption of in- fallibility in forbidding the propagation of error, than in any other thing which is done by public authority on its own judgment and responsibility. Judgment is given to men that they may use it. Because it may be used erroneously, are men to be told that they ought not to use it at all ? To pro- hibit what they think pernicious, is not claiming exemption from error, but fulfilling the duty in- cumbent on them, although fallible, of acting on their conscientious conviction. If we were never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed. An objection which applies to all conduct, can be no valid ob- jection to any conduct in particular. It is the duty of governments, and of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can ; to form them care- fully, and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of being right. But when they
THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION. 37
are sure (such reasoners may say), it is not con- scientiousness but cowardice to shrink from acting on their opinions, and allow doctrines which they honestly think dangerous to the welfare of man- kind, either in this life or in another, to be scat- tered abroad without restraint, because other people, in less enlightened times, have persecuted opinions now believed to be true. Let us take care, it may be said, not to make the same mistake : but governments and nations have made mistakes in other things, which are not denied to be fit subjects for the exercise of authority : they have laid on bad taxes, made unjust wars. Ought we therefore to lay on no taxes, and, under whatever provocation, make no wars ? Men, and governments, must act to the best of their ability. There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is assurance suffi- cient for the purposes of human life. We may, and must, assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own conduct : and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad men to pervert society by the propagation of opinions which we regard as false and pernicious.
I answer, that it is assuming very much more. There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every oppor- tunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not per- mitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contra-
88 OP THE LIBERTY OF
dieting and disproving our opinion, is the very con- dition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action ; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.
When we consider either the history of opinion, or the ordinary conduct of human life, to what is it to be ascribed that the one and the other are no worse than they are ? Not certainly to the inhe- rent force of the human understanding ; for, on any matter not self-evident, there are ninety-nine per- sons totally incapable of judging of it, for one who is capable; and the capacity of the hundredth person is only comparative ; for the majority of the eminent men of every past generation held many opinions now known to be erroneous, and did or approved numerous things which no one will now justify. Why is it, then, that there is on the whole a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct ? If there really is this preponderance — which there must be unless human affairs are, and have always been, in an almost desperate state — it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of everything re- spectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely, that his errors are corrigible. He is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discus- sion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience
THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION. S9
is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and prac- tices gradually yield to fact and argument : but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on tbe mind, must be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning. The whole strength and value, then, of human judgment, de- pending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand. In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so ? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and con- duct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him ; to profit by as much of it as was just, and expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious. Because he has felt, that the only way in which a human being can make some ap- proach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this ; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with
40 OF THE LIBERTY OF
those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it : for, being cognisant of all that can, at least obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his posi- tion against all gainsayers — knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties, instead of avoiding them, and has shut out no light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter — he has a right to think his judgment better than that of any person, or any multitude, who have not gone through a similar process.
It is not too much to require that what the wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to war- rant their relying on it, should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the pubhc. The most intolerant of churches, the Koman Catholic Church, even at the canonization of a saint, ad- mits, and listens patiently to, a * devil's advocate/ The holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted to posthumous honours, until all that the devil could say against him is known and weighed. If even the Newtonian philosophy were not permitted to be questioned, mankind could not feel as com- plete assurance of its truth as they now do. The beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to
THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION. 41
the whole world to prove them unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still ; but we have done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of ; we have ne- glected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching us : if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiv- ing it ; and in the meantime we may rely on hav- ing attained such approach to truth, as is possible in our own day. This is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being, and this the sole way of attaining it.
Strange it is, that men should admit the validity of the arguments for free discussion, but object to their being ' pushed to an extreme ;' not seeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are not good for any case. Strange that they should imagine that they are not assum- ing infallibility, when they acknowledge that there should be free discussion on all subjects which can possibly be doubtful, but think that some particular principle or doctrine should be forbid- den to be questioned because it is so certain, that is, because they are certain that it is certain. To call any proposition certain, while there is any one who would deny its certainty if permitted, but who is not permitted, is to assume that we our-
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THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION.
43
be an infallible judge of opinions. But those who thus satisfy themselves, do not perceive that the assumption of infallibility is mereh' shifted from one point to another. The usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion : as disputable, as open to discussion, and requiring discussion as much, as the opinion itself. There is the same need of an infallible judge of opinions to decide an opinion to be noxious, as to decide it to be false, unless the opinion condemned has full opportunity of defending itself. And it will not do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the utility or harmlessness of his opinion, though forbidden to maintain its truth. The truth of an opinion is part of its utility. If we would know whether or not it is desirable that a proposition should be believed, is it possible to exclude the consideration of whether or not it is true ? In the opinion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful : and can you prevent such men from urging that plea, when they are charged with culpability for denpng some doctrine which they are told is useful, but which they believe to be false ? Those who are on the side of received opinions, never fail to take all possible advantage of this plea ; you do not find them handling the question of utility as if it could be completely abstracted from that of truth : on the contrary, it
i
42 OF THE LIBERTY OF
selves, and those who agree with us, are the judges of certainty, and judges without hearing the other side.
In the present age — which has been described as * destitute of faith, but terrified at scepticism ' — in which people feel sure, not so much that their opinions are true, as that they should not know what to do without them — the claims of an opinion to be protected from public attack are rested not so much on its truth, as on its impor- tance to society. There are, it is alleged, certain beliefs, so useful, not to say indispensable to well- being, that it is as much the duty of governments to uphold those beliefs, as to protect any other of the interests of society. In a case of such neces- sity, and so directly in the hne of their duty, something less than infallibility may, it is main- tained, warrant, and even bind, governments, to act on their own opinion, confirmed by the general opinion of mankind. It is also often argued, and still oftener thought, that none but bad men would desire to weaken these salutary beliefs ; and there can be nothing wrong, it is thought, in restraining bad men, and prohibiting what only such men would wish to practise. This mode of thinking makes the justification of restraints on discussion not a question of the truth of doctrines, but of their usefulness ; and flatters itself by that means to escape the responsibility of claiming to
THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION. 43
be an infallible judge of opinions. But those who thus satisfy themselves, do not perceive that the assumption of infallibility is merely shifted from one point to another. The usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion : as disputable, as open to discussion, and requiring discussion as much, as the opinion itself. There is the same need of an infallible judge of opinions to decide an opinion to be noxious, as to decide it to be false, unless the opinion condemned has full opportunity of defending itself. And it will not do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the utility or harmlessness of his opinion, though forbidden to maintain its truth. The truth of an opinion is part of its utility. If we would know whether or not it is desirable that a proposition should be believed, is it possible to exclude the consideration of whether or not it is true ? In the opinion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful : and can you prevent such men from urging that plea, when they are charged with culpability for denying some doctrine which they are told is useful, but which they believe to be false ? Those who are on the side of received opinions, never fail to take all possible advantage of this plea ; you do not find them handling the question of utility as if it could be completely abstracted from that of truth : on the contrary, it
THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION".
45
"hih, you hold to be assuming infallibility ? But ' mst be permitted to observe, that it is not the ^3eng sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which ^ ill an assumption of infallibility. It is the mertaking to decide that question for others, wiiout allowing them to hear what can be said <)nhe contrary side. And I denounce and repro- bco this pretension not the less, if put forth on lib side of my most solemn convictions. How- ew positive any one's persuasion may be, not oiy of the falsity but of the pernicious conse- qences — not only of the pernicious consequences, bt (to adopt expressions which I altogether con- omn) the immorality and impiety of an opinion ; ^t if, in pursuance of that private judgment, lough' backed by the public judgment of his juntry or his cotemporaries, he prevents the oinion from being heard in its defence, he as- ames infallibility. And so far from the assumption eing less objectionable or less dangerous because he opinion is called immoral or impious, this is he case of all others in which it is most fatal. These are exactly the occasions on which the men jf one oreneration commit those dreadful mistakes, which excite the astonishment and horror of pos- terity. It is among such that we find the instances memorable in history, when the arm of the law has been employed to root out the best men and the noblest doctrines; with deplorable success as to
44 OF THE LIBERTY OF
is, above all, because their doctrine is ' the truth,' that the knowledge or the belief of it is held to be so indispensable. There can be no fair discus- sion of the question of usefulness, when an argu- ment so vital may be employed on one side, but not on the other. And in point of fact, when law or public feeling do not permit the truth of an opinion to be disputed, they are just as little tolerant of a denial of its usefulness. The utmost they allow is an extenuation of its absolute neces- sity, or of the positive guilt of rejecting it.
In order more fully to illustrate the mischief of denying a hearing to opinions because we, in our own judgment, have condemned them, it will be desirable to fix down the discussion to a concrete case ; and I choose, by preference, the cases which are least favourable to me — in which the argument against freedom of opinion, both on the score of truth and on that of utility, is considered the strongest. Let the opinions impugned be the belief in a God and in a future state, or any of the commonly received doctrines of morality. To fight the battle on such ground, gives a great ad- vantage to an unfair antagonist ; since he will be sure to say (and many who have no desire to be unfair will say it internally), Are these the doc- trines which you do not deem sufficiently certain to be talven under the protection of law ? Is the belief in a God one of the opinions, to feel sure of
THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION. 45
which, you hold to be assuming infallibility ? But I must be permitted to observe, that it is not the feeling sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which I call an assumption of infallibility. It is the undertaking to decide that question for others, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side. And I denounce and repro- bate this pretension not the less, if put forth on the side of my most solemn convictions. How- ever positive any one's persuasion may be, not only of the falsity but of the pernicious conse- quences— not only of the pernicious consequences, but (to adopt expressions which I altogether con- demn) the immorality and impiety of an opinion ; yet if, in pursuance of that private judgment, though* backed by the public judgment of his country or his cotemporaries, he prevents the opinion from being heard in its defence, he as- sumes infallibility. And so far from the assumption being less objectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called immoral or impious, this is the case of all others in which it is most fatal. These are exactly the occasions on which the men of one generation commit those dreadful mistakes, which excite the astonishment and horror of pos- terity. It is among such that we find the instances memorable in history, when the arm of the law has been employed to root out the best men and the noblest doctrines; with deplorable success as to
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the men, though some of the doctrines have sur- vived to be (as if in mockery) invoked, in defence of similar conduct towards those who Hissent from the^rfi, or from their received interpretation.
Mankind can hardly be too often reminded, that there was once a man named Socrates, be- tween whom and the legal authorities and public opinion of his time, there took place a memorable collision. Born in an age and country abounding in individual greatness, this man has been handed down to us by those who best knew both him and the age, as the most virtuous man in it ; while we know him as the head and prototype of all subse- quent teachers of virtue, the source equally of the lofty inspiration of Plato and the judicious utili- tarianism of Aristotle, H maestri di color die sanno,' the two headsprings of ethical as of all other philosophy. This acknowledged master of all the eminent thinkers who have since lived — whose fame, still growing after more than two thousand years, all but outweighs the whole re- mainder of the names which make his native city illustrious — was put to death by his countrymen, after a judicial conviction, for impiety and immo- rality. Impiety, in denying the gods recognised by the State ; indeed his accuser asserted (see the * Apologia ') that he believed in no gods at all. Immorahty, in being, by his doctrines and instruc- tions, a 'corrupter of youth.' Of these charges
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the tribunal, there is every ground for believing, honestly found him guilty, and condemned the man who probably of all then born had deserved best of mankind, to be put to death as a criminal. To pass from this to the only other instance of judicial iniquity, the mention of which, after the condemnation of Socrates, would not be an anti- climax : the event which took place on Calvary rather more than eighteen hundred years ago. The man who left on the memory of those who witnessed his life and conversation, such an im- pression of his moral grandeur, that eighteen sub- sequent centuries have done homage to him as the Almighty in person, was ignominiouslyputto death, as what ? As a blasphemer. Men did not merely mistake their benefactor ; they mistook him for the exact contrary of what he was, and treated him as that prodigy of impiety, which they them- selves are now held to be, for their treatment of him. The feelings with which mankind now re- gard these lamentable transactions, especially the later of the two, render them extremely unjust in their judgment of the unhappy actors. These were, to all appearance, not bad men — not worse than men commonly are, but rather the contrary ; men who possessed in a full, or somewhat more than a full measure, the religious, moral, and patriotic feelings of their time and people : the very kind of men who, in all times, our own in-
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eluded, have every chance of passing through hfe blameless and respected. The high-priest who rent his garments when the words were pro- nounced, which, according to all the ideas of his country, constituted the blackest guilt, was in all probability quite as sincere in his horror and in- dignation, as the generality of respectable and pious men now are in the religious and moral sen- timents they profess ; and most of those who now shudder at his conduct, if they had lived in his time, and been born Jews, would have acted pre- cisely as he did. Orthodox Christians who are tempted to think that those who stoned to death the first martyrs must have been worse men than they themselves are, ought to remember that one of those persecutors was Saint Paul.
Let us add one more example, the most striking of all, if the impressiveness of an error is measured by the wisdom and virtue of him who falls into it. If ever any one, possessed of power, had grounds for thinking himself the best and most enlightened among his cotemporaries, it was the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Absolute monarch of the whole civilized world, he preserved through life not only the most unblemished justice, but what was less to be expected from his Stoical breeding, the tenderest heart. The few failings which are attributed to him, were all on the side of indulgence : while his writings, the highest ethical product of the ancient
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mind, differ scarcely perceptibly, if they differ at all, from the most characteristic teachings of Christ. This man, a better Christian in all but the dogmatic sense of the word, than almost any of the osten- sibly Christian sovereigns who have since reigned, persecuted Christianity. Placed at the summit of all the previous attainments of humanity, with an open, unfettered intellect, and a character which led him of himself to embody in his moral writings the Christian ideal, he yet failed to see that Christianity was to be a good and not an evil to the world, with his duties to which he was so deeply penetrated. Existing society he knew to be in a deplorable state. But such as it was^ he saw, or thought he saw, that it was held together, and prevented from being worse, by belief and reverence of the received divinities. As a ruler of mankind, he deemed it his duty not to suffer society to fall in pieces ; and saw not how, if its existing ties were removed, any others could be formed which could again knit it together. The new religion opeuly aimed at dissolving these ties : unless, therefore^ it was his duty to adopt that religion, it seemed to be his duty to put it down. Inasmuch then as the theology of Christianity did not appear to him true or of divine origin ; inasmuch as this strange history of a crucified God was not credible to him, and a system which purported to rest entirely upon a foundation to him so wholly unbeliev- D
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able, could not be foreseen by him to be that renovating agency which, after all abatements, it has in fact proved to be ; the gentlest and most amiable of philosophers and rulers, under a solemn sense of duty, authorized the persecution of Chris- tianity. To my mind this is one of the most tra- gical facts in all history. It is a bitter thought, how different a thing the Christianity of the world might have been, if the Christian faith had been adopted as the religion of the empire under the auspices of Marcus Aurelius instead of those of Constantine. But it would be equally unjust to him and false to truth, to deny, that no one plea which can be urged for punishing anti-Christian teaching, was wanting to Marcus Aurelius for punishing, as he did, the propagation of Christianity. No Christian more firmly believes that Atheism is false, and tends to the dissolution of society, than Marcus Aurelius believed the same things of Christianity ; he who, of all men then living, might have been thought the most capable of appreciating it. Unless any one who approves of punishment for the promulgation of opinions, flatters himself that he is a wiser and better man than Marcus Aurelius — more deeply versed in the wisdom of his time, more elevated in his intellect above it — more earnest in his search for truth, or more single-minded in his devotion to it when found ; — let him abstain from that assumption of the joint
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infallibility of himself and the multitude, which the great Antoninus made with so unfortunate a result.
Aware of the impossibility of defending the use of punishment for restraining irreligious opinions, by any argument which will not justify Marcus Antoninus, the enemies of religious freedom, when hard pressed, occasionally accept this consequence, and say, with Dr. Johnson, that the persecutors of Christianity were in the right ; that persecution is an ordeal through which truth ought to pass, and always passes successfully, legal penalties being, in the end, powerless against truth, though sometimes beneficially effective against mischievous errors. This is a form of the argument for religious into- lerance, sufficiently remarkable not to be passed without notice.
A theory which maintains that truth may justi- fiably be persecuted because persecution cannot pos- sibly do it any harm, cannot be charged with being intentionally hostile to the reception of new truths ; but we cannot commend the generosity of its deal- ing with the persons to whom mankind are in- debted for them. To discover to the world some- thing which deeply concerns it, and of which it was previously ignorant; to prove to it that it bad been mistaken on some vital point of temporal or spiritual interest, is as important a service as a human being can render to his fellow-creatures, d2
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and in certain cases, as in those of the early Chris- tians and of the Reformers, those who think with Dr. Johnson believe it to have been the most pre- cious gift which could be bestowed on mankind. That the authors of such splendid benefits should be requited by martyrdom; that their reward should be to be (Jealt with as the vilest of crimi- nals, is not, upon this theory, a deplorable error and misfortune, for which humanity should mourn in sackcloth and ashes, but the normal and justifi- able state of things. The propounder of a new truth, according to this doctrine, should stand, as stood, in the legislation of the Locrians, the pro- poser of a new law, with a halter round his neck, to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition. People who defend this mode of treating benefactors, cannot be supposed to set much value on the benefit ; and*I believe this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now.
But, indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all expe- rience refutes. History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution. If not suppressed
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for ever, it may be thrown back for centuries. To speak only of religious opinions : the Reformation broke out at least twenty times before Luther, and was put down. Arnold of Brescia was put down. Fra Dolcino was put down. Savonarola was put down. The Albigeois were put down. The Vau- dois were put down. The Lollards were put down. The Hussites were put down. Even after the era of Luther, wherever persecution was persisted in, it was successful. In Spain, Italy, Flanders, the Austrian empire, Protestantism was rooted out; and, most likely, would have been so in England, had Queen Mary lived, or Queen EUzabeth died. Persecution has always succeeded, save where the heretics were too strong a party to be effectually persecuted. No reasonable person can doubt that Christianity might have been extirpated in the Roman Empire. It spread, and became predomi- nant, because the persecutions were only occasional, lasting but a short time, and separated by long inter- vals of almost undisturbed propagandism. It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error, of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake. Men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for error, and a sufficient application of legal or even of social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either. The real advantage which truth has, consists in
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this, that when an opinion is true, it may be extin- guished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found per- sons to rediscover it, until some one of its reap- pearances falls on a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it.
It will be said, that we do not now put to death the introducers of new opinions : we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets, we even build sepulchres to them. It is true we no longer put heretics to death ; and the amount of penal inflic- tion which modern feeling would probably tolerate, even against the most obnoxious opinions, is not sufficient to extirpate them. But let us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free from the stain even of legal persecution. Penalties for opinion, or at least for its expression, still exist by law ; and their enforcement is not, even in these times, so unex- ampled as to make it at all incredible that they may some day be revived in full force. In the year 1857, at the summer assizes of the county of Corn- wall, an unfortunate man,* said to be of unexcep- tionable conduct in all relations of life, was sen- tenced to twenty-one months' imprisonment, for uttering, and writing on a gate, some offensive
* Thomas Pooley, Bodmin Assizes, July 31, 1857. In De- cember following, he received a free pardon from the Crown.
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words concerning Christianity. Within a month of the same time, at the Old Bailey, two persons, on two separate occasions,* were rejected as jurymen, and one of them grossly insulted by the judge and by one of the counsel, because they honestly declared that they had no theological belief; and a third, a foreigner,-j- for the same reason, was denied justice against a thief. This refusal of redress took place in virtue of the legal doctrine, that no person can be allowed to give evidence in a court of justice, who does not profess belief in a God (any god is sufficient) and in a future state ; which is equivalent to declaring such persons to be outlaws, excluded from the protection of the tribu- nals ; who may not only be robbed or assaulted with impunity, if no one but themselves, or per- sons of similar opinions, be present, but any one else may be robbed or assaulted with impunity, if the proof of the fact depends on their evidence. The assumption on which this is grounded, is that the oath is worthless, of a person who does not be- lieve in a future state ; a proposition which be- tokens much ignorance of history in those who assent to it (since it is historically true that a large proportion of infidels in all ages have been persons
* George Jacob Holyoake, August 17, 1857 ; Edward Truelove, July, 1857.
f Baron de Gleichen, Marlborough-street Police Court, August 4, 1857.
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^X
r tJ3
of distiDguished integrity and honour) ; and would be maintained by no one who had the smallest conception how many of the persons in greatest repute with the world, both for virtues and for attainments, are well known, at least to their inti- mates, to be unbelievers. The rule, besides, is suicidal, and cuts away its own foundation. Under pretence that atheists must be liars, it admits the testimony of all atheists who are willing to lie, and rejects only those who brave the obloquy of pub- licly confessing a detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood. A rule thus self-convicted of absur- dity so far as regards its professed purpose, can be kept in force only as a badge of hatred, a relic of persecution ; a persecution, too, having the pecu- liarity, that the qualification for undergoing it, is the being clearly proved not to deserve it. The rule, and the theory it implies, are hardly less in- sulting to believers than to infidels. For if he who does not believe in a future state, necessarily lies, it follows that they who do believe are only prevented from lying, if i^revented they are, by the fear of hell. We will not do the authors and abettors of the rule the injury of supposing, that the concep- tion which they have formed of Christian virtue is drawn from their own consciousness.
These, indeed, are but rags and remnants of persecution, and may be thought to be not so much an indication of the wish to persecute, as an ex-
wliidibsii*^-
^t
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57
ample of that very frequent infirmity of English minds, which makes them take a preposterous pleasure in the assertion of a bad principle, when they are no longer bad enough to desire to carry it really into practice. But unhappily there is no security in the state of the public mind, that the suspension of worse forms of legal persecution, which has lasted for about the space of a genera- tion, will continue. In this age the quiet surface of routine is as often ruffled by attempts to resusci- tate past evils, as to introduce new benefits. What is boasted of at the present time as the revival of re- ligion, is always, in narrow and uncultivated minds, at least as much the revival of bigotry ; and where there is the strong permanent leaven of in- tolerance in the feelings of a people, which at all times abides in the middle classes of this country, it needs but little to provoke them into actively persecuting those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects of persecution."^ For it is this —
* Ample warning may be drawn from the large infusion of the passions of a persecutor, which mingled with the general display of the worst parts of our national character on the occasion of the Sepoy insurrection. The ravings of fanatics or charlatans from the pulpit may be unworthy of notice ; but the heads of the Evangelical party have announced as their principle for the government of Hindoos and Mahoraedans, that no schools be supported by public money in which the Bible is not taught, and by necessary consequence that no public employment be given to any but real or pretended Christians. An Under-Secretary of State, in a speech delivered to his constituents on the 12th of
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of distiDguished integrity and honour) ; and would be maintained by no one who had the smallest conception how many of the persons in greatest repute with the world, both for virtues and for attainments, are well known, at least to their inti- mates, to be unbelievers. The rule, besides, is suicidal, and cuts away its own foundation. Under pretence that atheists must be liars, it admits the testimony of all atheists who are willing to lie, and rejects only those who brave the obloquy of pub- licly confessing a detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood. A rule thus self-convicted of absur- dity so far as regards its professed purpose, can be kept in force only as a badge of hatred, a relic of persecution ; a persecution, too, having the pecu- liarity, that ihe qualification for undergoing it, is the being clearly proved not to deserve it. The rule, aud the theory it implies, are hardly less in- sulting to believers than to infidels. For if he who does not believe in a future state, necessarily lies, it follows that they who do believe are only prevented from lying, if iDrevented they are, by the fear of hell. We will not do the authors and abettors of the rule the injury of supposing, that the concep- tion which they have formed of Christian virtue is drawn from their own consciousness.
These, indeed, are but rags and remnants of persecution, and may be thought to be not so much an indication of the wish to persecute, as an ex-
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ample of that very frequent infirmity of English minds, which makes them take a preposterous pleasure in the assertion of a bad principle, when they are no longer bad enough to desire to carry it really into practice. But unhappily there is no security in the state of the public mind, that the suspension of worse forms of legal persecution, which has lasted for about the space of a genera- tion, will continue. In this age the quiet surface of routine is as often rufiSed by attempts to resusci- tate past evils, as to introduce new benefits. What is boasted of at the present time as the revival of re- ligion, is always, in narrow and uncultivated minds, at least as much the revival of bigotry ; and where there is the strong permanent leaven of in- tolerance in the feelings of a people, which at all times abides in the middle classes of this country, it needs but little to provoke them into actively persecuting those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects of persecution."^ For it is this —
* Ample warning may be drawn from the large infusion of the passions of a persecutor, which mingled with the general display of the worst parts of our national character on the occasion of the Sepoy insurrection. The ravings of fanatics or charlatans from the pulpit may be unworthy of notice ; but the heads of the Evangelical party have announced as their principle for the government of Hindoos and Mahomedans, that no schools be supported by public money in which the Bible is not taught, and by necessary consequence that no public employment be given to any but real or pretended Christians. An Under-Secretary of State, in a speech delivered to his constituents on the 12th of
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it is the opinioDs men entertain, and the feelings tliey cherish, respecting those who disown the beliefs they deem important, which makes this country not a place of mental freedom. For a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties is that they strengthen the social stigma. It is that stigma which is really effective, and so effective is it, that the profession of opinions which are under the ban of society is much less common in Eng- land, than is, in many other countries, the avowal of those which incur risk of judicial punishment. In respect to all persons but those whose pe- cuniary circumstances make them independent of the good will of other people, opinion, on this sub- ject, is as efficacious as law ; men might as well be imprisoned, as excluded from the means of earn-
November, 1857, is reported to have said: 'Toleration of their faith' (the faith of a hundred millions of British subjects), 'the superstition which they called religion, by the British Government, had had the effect of retarding the ascendancy of the British name, and preventing the salutary gi-owth of Christianity. . . . Tole- ration was the great corner-stone of the religious liberties of this country ; but do not let them abuse that precious word toleration . As he understood it, it meant the complete liberty to all, freedom of worship, among Christians, who worshipped upon the same foundation. It meant toleration of all sects and denominations of Christians who believed in the one mediation.' I desire to call attention to the fact, that a man who has been deemed fit to fill a high office in the government of this country, under a liberal Ministry, maintains the doctrine that all who do not believe in the divinity of Christ are beyond the pale of toleration. Who, after this imbecile display, can indulge the illusion that religious persecution has passed away, never to return ?
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ing their bread. Those whose bread is already se- cured, and who desire no favours from men in power, or from bodies of men, or from the public, have nothing to fear from the open avowal of any opinions, but to be ill-thought of and ill-spoken of, and this it ought not to require a very heroic mould to enable them to bear. There is no room for any appeal ad misericordiam in behalf of such persons. But though we do not now inflict so much evil on those who think differently from us, as it was formerly our custom to do, it may be that we do ourselves as much evil as ever by our treatment of them. Socrates was put to death, but the Socratic philosophy rose like the sun in heaven, and spread its illumination over the whole intel- lectual firmament. Christians were cast to the lions, but the Christian church grew up a stately and spreading tree, overtopping the older and less vigorous growths, and stifling them by its shade. Our merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for their diffu- sion. With us, heretical opinions do not perceptibly gain, or even lose, ground in each decade or gene- ration ; they never blaze out far and wide, but continue to smoulder in the narrow circles of thinking and studious persons among whom they originate, without ever lighting up the general affairs of mankind with either a true or a decep-
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tive light. And thus is kept up a state of things very satisfactory to some minds, because, without the unpleasant process of fining or imprisoning anybody, it maintains all prevailing opinions out- wardly undisturbed, while it does not absolutely interdict the exercise of reason by dissentients afflicted with the malady of thought. A conve- nient plan for having peace in the intellectual world, and keeping all things going on therein very much as they do already. But the price paid for this sort of intellectual pacification, is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the human mind. A state of things in which a large portion of the most active and inquiring intellects find it advisable to keep the general principles and grounds of their convictions within their own breasts, and attempt, in what they address to the public, to fit as much as they can of their own conclusions to premises which they have internally renounced, cannot send forth the open, fearless characters, and logical, con- sistent intellects who once adorned the thinking world. The sort of men who can be looked for under it, are either mere conformers to common- place, or time-servers for truth, whose arguments on all great subjects are meant for their hearers, and are not those which have convinced them- selves. Those who avoid this alternative, do so by narrowing their thoughts and interest to things which can be spoken of without venturing within
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the region of principles, that is, to small practical matters^ which would come right of themselves, if but the minds of mankind were strengthened and enlarged, and which will never be made effectually ri^ht until then : while that which would strengthen and enlarge men's minds, free and daring specu- lation on the highest subjects, is abandoned.
Those in whose eyes this reticence on the part of heretics is no evil, should consider in the first place, that in consequence of it there is never any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions ; and that such of them as could not stand such a discussion, though they may be prevented from spreading, do not disappear. But it is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most, by the ban placed on all inquiry which does not end in the orthodox conclusions. The greatest harm done Ls to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy. Who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in something which would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral ? Among them we may occasionally see some man of deep conscientiousness, and subtle and refined understanding, who spends a life in sophisticating with an intellect which he cannot
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silence, and exhausts the resources of ingenuity in attempting to reconcile the promptings of his con- science and reason with orthodoxy, which yet he does not, perhaps, to the end succeed in doing. No one can be a great thinker who does not re- cognise, that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead. Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer them- selves to think. Not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as much and even more indispensable, to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of. There have been, and may again be, great individual thinkers, in a general atmo- sphere of mental slavery. But there never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere, an intel- lectually active people. Where any people has made a temporary approach to such a character, it has been because the dread of heterodox specula- tion was for a time suspended. Where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be dis- puted ; where the discussion of the greatest ques- tions which can occupy humanity is considered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high scale of mental activity which has made some
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periods of history so remarkable. Never when controversy avoided the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm, was the mind of a people stirred up from its founda- tions, and the impulse given which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect to some- thing of the dignity of thinking beings. Of such we have had an example in the condition of Europe during the times immediately following the Reformation ; another, though limited to the Con- tinent and to a more cultivated class, in the speculative movement of the latter half of the eighteenth century ; and a third, of still briefer duration, in the intellectual fermentation of Ger- many during the Goethian and Fichtean period. These periods differed widely in the particular opinions which they developed ; but were alike in this, that during all three the yoke of authority was broken. In each, an old mental despotism had been thrown off, and no new one had yet taken its place. The impulse given at these three periods has made Europe what it now is. Every single improvement which has taken place either in the human mind or in institutions, may be traced distinctly to one or other of them. Appearances have for some time indicated that all three impulses are well nigh spent ; and we can expect no fresh start, until we again assert our mental freedom.
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Let us now pass to the second division of the argument, and dismissing the supposition that any of the received opinions maybe false, let us assume them to be true, and examine into the worth of the manner in which they are likely to be held, when their truth is not freely and openly canvassed. However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.
There is a class of persons (happily not quite so numerous as formerly) who think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what they think true, though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it against the most superficial objections. Such persons, if they can once get their creed taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its being allowed to be questioned. Where their influence prevails, they make it nearly impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately, though it may still be rejected rashly and igno- rantly ; for to shut out discussion entirely is seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not grounded on conviction are apt to give way before
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tlie sliofhtest semblance of an argument. Wavinof, however, this possibility — assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a pre- judice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument — this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.
If the intellect and judgment of mankind ought to be cultivated^ a thing which Protestants at least do not deny, on what can these faculties be more appropriately exercised by any one, than on the things which concern him so much that it is con- sidered necessary for him to hold opinions on them ? If the cultivation of the understanding con- sists in one thing more than in another, it is surely in learning the grounds of one's own opinions. Whatever people believe, on subjects on which it is of the first importance to believe rightly, they ought to be able to defend against at least the common objections. But, some one may say, ' Let them be taught the grounds of their opinions. It does not follow that opinions must be merely par- roted because they are never heard controverted. Persons who learn geometry do not simply com- mit the theorems to memory, but understand and learn likewise the demonstrations ; and it would be absurd to say that they remain ignorant of the E
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grounds of geometrical truths, because they never hear any one deny, and attempt to disprove them/ Undoubtedly : and such teaching suffices on a sub- ject like mathematics, where there is nothing at all to be said on the wrong side of the question. The peculiarity of the evidence of mathematical truths is, that all the argument is on one side. There are no objections, and no answers to objections. But on every subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting reasons. Even in natural philosophy, there is always some other explanation possible of the same facts ; some geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen ; and it has to be shown why that other theory cannot be the true one : and until this is shown, and until we knov/ how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds of our opinion. But when we turn to subjects infinitely more complicated, to morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which favour some opinion different from it. The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has left it on record that he always studied his adversary's case with as great, if not with still greater, intensity than even his own. What Cicero practised as the means of forensic success, requires to be imitated
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by all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth. He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side ; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for pre- ferring either opinion. The rational position for him would be suspension of judgment, and unless he contents himself with that, he is either led by authority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to which he feels most inclination. Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. That is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them ; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form ; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of; else he will never really possess himself of the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty. Ninety-nine in a hundred of what are called educated men are in this condition ; even af those who can argue fluently for their opinions. e2
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Their conclusion may be true, but it might be false for anything they know : they have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them, and con- sidered what such persons may have to say ; and consequently they do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess. They do not know those parts of it which explain and justify the remainder ; the considera- tions which show that a fact which seemingly con- flicts with another is reconcilable with it, or that, of two apparently strong reasons, one and not the other ought to be preferred. All that part of the truth which turns the scale, and decides the judg- ment of a completely informed mind, they are strangers to; nor is it ever really known, but to those who have attended equally and impartially to both sides, and endeavoured to see the reasons of both in the strongest hght. So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human sub- jects^ that if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skilful devil's advocate can conjure up.
To abate the force of these considerations, an enemy of free discussion may be supposed to say, that there is no necessity for mankind in general to know and understand all that can be said against or for their opinions by philosophers and
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theologians. That it is not needful for common men to be able to expose all the misstatements or fallacies of an ingenious opponent. That it is enough if there is always somebody capable of answering them, so that nothing likely to mislead uninstructed persons remains unrefuted. That simple minds, having been taught the obvious grounds of the truths inculcated on them, may trust to authority for the rest, and being aware that they have neither knowledge nor talent to resolve every difficulty which can be raised, may repose in the assurance that all those which have been raised have been or can be answered^ by those who are specially trained to the task.
Conceding to this view of the subject the ut- most that can be claimed for it by those most easily satisfied with the amount of understanding of truth which ought to accompany the belief of it ; even so^ the argument for free discussion is no way weakened. For even this doctrine acknow- ledges that mankind ought to have a rational assurance that all objections have been satisfac- torily answered ; and how are they to be answered if that which requires to be answered is not spoken ? or how can the answer be known to be satisfactory, if the objectors have no opportunity of showing that it is unsatisfactory ? If not the public, at least the philosophers and theologians who are to resolve the difficulties, must make
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themselves familiar with those difficulties in their most puzzling form ; and this cannot be accom- plished unless they are freely stated, and placed in the most advantageous light which they admit of. The Catholic Church has its own way of dealing with this em barrassing problem. It makes a broad separation between those who can be per- mitted to receive its doctrines on conviction, and those who must accept them on trust. Neither, indeed, are allowed any choice as to what they will accept ; but the clergy, such at least as can be fully confided in, may admissibly and meri- toriously make themselves acquainted with the arguments of opponents, in order to answer them, and may, therefore, read heretical books ; the laity, not unless by special permission, hard to be obtained. This discipline recognises a knowledge of the enemy's case as beneficial to the teachers, but finds means, consistent with this, of denying it to the rest of the world : thus giving to the elite more mental culture, though not more mental freedom, than it allows to the mass. By this de- vice it succeeds in obtaining the kind of mental superiority which its purposes require ; for though culture without freedom never made a large and liberal mind, it can make a clever nisi ijvius advocate of a cause. But in countries professing Protestantism, this resource is denied ; since Protestants hold, at least in theory, that the re-
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sponsibilifcy for the choice of a religion must be borne by each for himself, and cannot be thrown off upon teachers. Besides, in the present state of the world, it is practically impossible that writings which are read by the instructed can be kept from the uninstructed. If the teachers of mankind are to be cosfnisant of all that thev ouo^ht to know% everything must be free to be written and pub- lished without restraint.
If, however, the mischievous operation of the absence of free discussion, when the received opi- nions are true, were confined to leaving men ignorant of the grounds of those opinions, it might be thought that this, if an intellectual, is no moral evil, and does not affect the worth of the opinions,, regarded in their influence on the character. The fact, however, is, that not only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the meaning of the opinion itself. The words which convey it, cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small portion of those they were originally employed to communicate. Instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, there remain only a few phrases retained by rote ; or, if any part, the shell and husk only of the meaning is retained, the finer essence being lost. The great chapter in human history which this fact occupies and fills, cannot be too earnestly studied and meditated on.
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It is illustrated in the experieDce of almost all ethical doctrines and religious creeds. They are all full of meaning and vitality to those who ori- ginate them, and to the direct disciples of the originators. Their meaning continues to be felt in undiminished strength, and is perhaps brought out into even fuller consciousness, so long as the struggle lasts to give the doctrine or creed an ascendancy over other creeds. At last it either prevails, and becomes the general opinion, or its progress stops ; it keeps possession of the ground it has gained, but ceases to spread further. When either of these results has become apparent, con- troversy on the subject flags, and gradually dies away. The doctrine has taken its place, if not as a received opinion, as one of the admitted sects or divisions of opinion : those who hold it have gene- rally inherited, not adopted it ; and conversion from one of these doctrines to another, being now an exceptional fact, occupies little place in the thoughts of their professors. Instead of being, as at first, constantly on the alert either to defend themselves against the world, or to bring the world over to them, they have subsided into acqui- escence, and neither listen, when they can help it, to arguments against their creed, nor trouble dis- sentients (if there be such) with arguments in its favour. From this time may usually be dated the decline in the living power of the doctrine.
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We often bear the teachers of all creeds lamentinof the difficulty of keeping up in the minds of believers a lively apprehension of the truth which they nominally recognise, so that it may penetrate the feelings, and acquire a real mastery over the conduct. No such difficulty is complained of while the creed is still fiohtino^ for its existence : even the weaker combatants then know and feel what they are fighting for, and the difference between it and other doctrines ; and in that period of every creed's existence, not a few persons may be founds who have realized its fundamental prin- ciples in all the forms of thought, have weighed and considered them in all their important bear- ings, and have experienced the full effect on the character, which belief in that creed ought to pro- duce in a mind thoroughly imbued with it. But when it has come to be an hereditary creed, and to be received passively, not actively — when the mind is no longer compelled, in the same degree as at first, to exercise its vital powers on the questions which its belief presents to it, there is a progressive tendency to forget all of the belief except the formularies, or to give it a dull and torpid assent, as if accepting it on trust dispensed with the necessity of realizing it in consciousness, or testing it by personal experience ; until it almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human being. Then are seen the cases,
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SO frequent in this age of the world as almost to form the majority, in which the creed remains as it were outside the mind, incrusting and petri- fying it against all other influences addressed to the higher parts of our nature ; manifesting its power by not suffering any fresh and living con- viction to get in, but itself doing nothing for the mind or heart, except standing sentinel over them to keep them vacant.
To what an extent doctrines intrinsically fitted to make the deepest impression upon the mind may remain in it as dead beliefs, without being ever realized in the imagination, the feelings, or the understanding, is exemplified by the manner in which the majority of believers hold the doctrines of Christianity. By Christianity I here mean what is accounted such by all churches and sects — the maxims and precepts contained in the New Testament. These are considered sacred, and accepted as laws, by all professing Christians. Yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one Christian in a thousand guides or tests his _indi- vidual conduct by reference to those laws. The standard to which he does refer it, is the custom of his nation, his class, or his religious profession. He has thus, on the one hand, a collection of ethical maxims, which he believes to have been vouchsafed to him by infallible wisdom as rules for his government; and on the other, a set of
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every-day judgments and practices, which go a certain length with some of those maxims, not so great a length with others, stand in direct oppo- sition to some, and are, on the whole, a compro- mise between the Christian creed and the interests and suggestions of worldly life. To the first of these standards he gives his homage ; to the other his real allegiance. All Christians believe that the blessed are the poor and humble, and those who are ill-used by the world ; that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich m,an to enter the kingdom of heaven; that they should judge not, lest they be judged ; that they should swear not at all ; that they should love their neighbour as themselves ; that if one take their cloak, they should give him their coat also ; that they should take no thought for the morrow ; that if they would be perfect, they should sell all that they have and give it to the poor. They are not insincere when they say that they believe these things. They do believe them, as people believe what they have always heard lauded and never discussed. But in the sense of that living belief which regulates conduct, they believe these doctrines just up to the point to which it is usual to act upon them. The doctrines in their integrity are serviceable to pelt adversaries with; and it is understood that they are to be put forward (when possible) as
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the reasons for whatever people do that they think laudable. But any one who reminded them that the maxims require an infinity of things which they never even think of doing, would gain nothing but to be classed among those very unpopular characters who affect to be better than other people. The doctrines have no hold on ordinary behevers — are not a power in their minds. They have an habitual respect for the sound of them, but no feeling which spreads from the words to the things signified, and forces the mind to take them in, and make them conform to the formula. When- ever conduct is concerned, they look round for Mr. A and B to direct them how far to go in obeying Christ.
Now we may be well assured that the case was not thus, but far otherwise, with the early Christians. Had it been thus, Christianity never would have expanded from an obscure sect of the despised Hebrews into the religion of the Roman empire. When their enemies said, * See how these Christians love one another ' (a remark not likely to be made by anybody now), they assuredly had a much livelier feeling of the meaning of their creed than they have ever had since. And to this cause, probably, it is chiefly owing that Christianity now makes so little progress in extending its domain, and after eighteen centuries, is still nearly confined to Europeans and the descendants of
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Europeans. Even with the strictly religious, who are much in earnest about their doctrines, and attach a greater amount of meaning to many of them than people in general, it commonly happens that the part which is thus comparatively active in their minds is that which was made by Calvin, or Knox, or some such person much nearer in character to themselves. The sayings of Christ coexist passively in their minds, producing hardly any effect beyond what is caused by mere listening to words so amiable and bland. There are many reasons, doubtless, why doctrines which are the badge of a sect retain more of their vitality than those common to all recognised sects, and why more pains are taken by teachers to keep their meaning alive; but one reason certainly is, that the peculiar doctrines are more questioned, and have to be oftener defended against open gain- sayers. Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there is no enemy in the field. The same thing holds true, generally speaking, of all traditional doctrines — those of prudence and knowledge of life, as well as of morals or religion. All languages and literatures are full of general observations on life, both as to what it is,, and how to conduct oneself in it ; observations which everybody knows, which everybody repeats, or hears with acquiescence, which are received as truisms, yet of which most people first truly
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loam ^e moaning, when ox|>eriencc, generally of a J ifiil kind, has made it a reality to them. How ^n, when smarting under some unfore- seen 1 (fortune or disappointment, does a person call famili whic
mind some proverb
to him all his life, the meaning of he had ever before felt it as he does now, iuld have saved him from the calamity. Thoreire indeeil reasons for this, other than the abseno of discussion : there are many truths of which be full meaning oin)wt be realized, until personl experience has brought it home. But much aore of the meaning even of these would have fen understood, and what was understood wouldnave been far more dt^ply impressed on
I, if the man had
pw and con The fatal U ig about is the auth< a It.
customed to hear who did under- nankind to leave m it is no lo ^their errors. ''spoken of
'^f
^1^'
4b^
:^.fcl
M^mu
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learn the meaning, when experience, generally of a painful kind, has made it a reality to them. How often, when smarting under some unfore- seen misfortune or disappointment, does a person call to mind some proverb or common saying, familiar to him all his life, the meaning of which, if he had ever before felt it as he does now, would have saved him from the calamity. There are indeed reasons for this, other than the absence of discussion : there are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realized, until personal experience has brought it home. But much more of the meaning even of these would have been understood, and what was understood would have been far more deeply impressed on the mind, if the man had been accustomed to hear it argued pro and con by people who did under- stand it. The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors. A co- temporary author has well spoken of * the deep slumber of a decided opinion.'
But what ! (it may be asked) Is the absence of ■unanimity an indispensable condition of true knowledge ? Is it necessary that some part of mankind should persist in error, to enable any to realize the truth ? Does a belief cease to be real and vital as soon as it is generally received — and is a proposition never thoroughly understood and felt
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unless some doubt of it remains ? As soou as mankind have unanimously accepted a truth, does the truth perish within them ? The highest aim and best result of improved intelligence, it has hitherto been thought, is to unite mankind more and more in the acknowledgment of all important truths : and does the intelligence only last as long as it has not achieved its object ? Do the fruits of conquest perish by the very completeness of the victory ?
I affirm no such thing. As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no lonofer dis- puted or doubted will be constantly on the increase : and the well-being of mankind may al- most be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested. The cessation, on one question after another, of serious controversy, is one of the ne- cessary incidents of the consolidation of opinion ; a consolidation as salutary in the case of true opi- nions, as it is dangerous and noxious when the opinions are erroneous. But though this gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is necessary in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable and indispensable, we are not therefore obliged to conclude that all its conse- quences must be beneficial. The loss of so im- portant an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the
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necessity of explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents, though not sufficient to out- weigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefit of its universal recognition. Where this advan- tage can no longer be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavourinor to
o
provide a substitute for it ; some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion, eager for his conversion.
But instead of seeking contrivances for this pur- pose, they have lost those they formerly had. The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this description. They were essentially a negative dis- cussion of the great questions of philosophy and life, directed with consummate skill to the pur- pose of convincing any one who had merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion, ^that he did not understand the subject — that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doc- trines he professed ; in order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear ap- prehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school disputations of the middle ages had a somewhat similar object. They were intended to make sure that the pupil under-
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stood his own opinion, and (by necessary correla- tion) the opinion opposed to it, and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. These last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the premises appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason ; and, as a discipline to the mind, they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the ' Socratici viri : ' but the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit, and the present modes of education contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other. A person who derives all his instruc- tion from teachers or books, even if he escape the besetting temptation of contenting himself wdth cram, is under no compulsion to hear both sides; accordingly it is far from a frequent accomplish- ment, even among thinkers, to know both sides ; and the weakest part of what everybody says in defence of his opinion, is what he intends as a reply to antagonists. It is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic — that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result ; but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it cannot be valued too highly ; and until^ F
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people are again systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general ave- rage of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physical departments of speculation. On any other subject no oner's opinions deserve the name of know- ledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active contro- versy with opponents. That, therefore, which when absent, it is so indispensable, but so difficult, to create, how worse than absurd it is to forego, when spontaneously offering itself ! If there are any persons who contest a received opinion, or who will do so if law or opinion will let them, let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is some one to do for us what we otherwise ought, if we have any re- gard for either the certainty or the vitality of our convictions, to do with much greater labour for ourselves.
It still remains to speak of one of the principal causes which make diversity of opinion advanta- geous, and will continue to do so until mankind shall have entered a stage of intellectual advance- ment which at present seems at an incalculable distance. We have hitherto considered only two possibilities: that the received opinion may be
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false, and some other opinion, consequently, true ; or that, the received opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear ap- prehension and deep feeling of its truth. But there is a commoner case than either of these ; when the conflicting doctrines, instead of being one true and the other false, share the truth be- tween them; and the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part. Popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth. They are a part of the truth ; some- times a greater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjoined from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and limited. Heretical opinions, on the other hand, are generally some of these suppressed and neg- lected truths, bursting the bonds which kept them down, and either seeking reconciliation with the truth contained in the common opinion, or front- ing it as enemies, and setting themselves up, with similar exclusiveness, as the whole truth. The latter case is hitherto the most frequent, as, in the human mind, one-sidedness has always been the rule, and many-sidedness the exception. Hence, even in revolutions of opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another rises. Even progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only r2
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substitutes, one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the time, than that which it displaces. Such being the partial cha- racter of prevailing opinions,- even when resting on a true foundation, every opinion which em- bodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be considered precious, with whatever amount of error and con- fusion that truth may be blended. No sober judge of human affairs will feel bound to be in- dignant because those who force on our notice truths which we should otherwise have overlooked, overlook some of those which we see. Rather, he will think that so long as popular truth is one- sided, it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided asserters too ; such being usually the most energetic, and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole.
Thus, in the eighteenth century, when nearly all the instructed, and all those of the uninstructed who were led by them, were lost in admiration of what is called civilization, and of the marvels of modern science, literature, and philosophy, and while greatly overrating the amount of unlikeness between the men of modern and those of ancient
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times, indulged the belief that the whole of the difference was in their own favour ; with what a salutary shock did the paradoxes of Rousseau explode like bombshells in the midst, dislocating the compact mass of one-sided opinion, and forcing its elements to recombine in a better form and with additional ingredients. Not that the current opinions were on the whole farther from the truth than Rousseau's were ; on the contrary, they were nearer to it ; they contained more of positive truth, and very much less of error. Nevertheless there lay in Rousseau's doctrine, and has floated down the stream of opinion along with it, a considerable amount of exactly those truths which the popular opinion wanted ; and these are the deposit which was left behind when the flood subsided. The superior worth of sim- plicity of life, the enervating and demoralizing effect of the trammels and hypocrisies of artificial society, are ideas which have never been entirely absent from cultivated minds since Rousseau wrote ; and they will in time produce their due effect, though at present needing to be asserted as much as ever, and to be asserted by deeds, for words, on this subject, have nearly exhausted their power.
In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements
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of a healthy state of political life ; until the one or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away. Each of these modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other ; but it is in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity. Unless opinions favourable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to co-operation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with equal freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due ; one scale is sure to go up, and the other down. Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile ban- ners. On any of the great open questions just enu- merated, if either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not merely to be tolerated,
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but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority. That is the opinion which, for the time being, represents the neglected interests, the side of human well-being which is in danger of obtaining less than its share. I am aware that there is not, in this country, any in- tolerance of differences of opinion on most of these topics. They are adduced to show, by admitted and multiplied examples, the universality of the fact, that only through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth. When there are persons to be found, who form an exception to the apparent unanimity of the world on any subject, even if the world is in the right, it is always probable that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for themselves, and that truth would lose something by their silence.
It may be objected, ' But some received prin- ciples, especially on the highest and most vital subjects, are more than half-truths. The Chris- tian morality, for instance, is the whole truth on that subject, and if any one teaches a morality which varies from it, he is wholly in error.' As this is of all cases the most important in practice, none can be fitter to test the general maxim. But before pronouncing what Christian morality
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is or is not, it would be desirable to decide what is meant by Christian morality. If it means the morality of the New Testament, I wonder that any one who derives his knowledge of this from the book itself, can suppose that it was an- nounced^ or intended, as a complete doctrine of morals. The Gospel always refers to a pre-exist- ing morality, and confines its precepts to the particulars in which that morality was to be cor- rected, or superseded by a wider and higher ; ex- pressing itself, moreover, in terms most general, often impossible to be interpreted literally, and possessing rather the impressiveness of poetry or eloquence than the precision of legislation. To extract from it a body of ethical doctrine, has never been possible without eking it out from the Old Testament, that is, from a system elaborate indeed, but in many respects barbarous, and intended only for a barbarous people. St. Paul, a declared enemy to this Judaical mode of interpreting the doctrine and filling up the scheme of his Master, equally assumes a pre-existing morality, namely that of the Greeks and Romans ; and his advice to Chris- tians is in a great measure a system of accommo- dation to that: even to the extent of sivinof an apparent sanction to slavery. What is called Christian, but should rather be termed theolosfical, morality, was not the work of Christ or the Apostles, but is of much later origin, having been
THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION. 89'
gradually built up by the Catholic church of the first five centuries, and though not implicitly adopted by moderns and Protestants, has been much less modified by them than might have been expected. For the most part, indeed, they have con- tented themselves with cutting off the additions which had been made to it in the middle ages, each sect supplying the place by fresh additions, adapted to its own character and tendencies. That mankind owe a great debt to this morality, and to its early teachers, I should be the last person to deny ; but I do not scruple to say of it, that it is, in many important points, incomplete and one-sided, and that unless ideas and feelings, not sanctioned by it, had contributed to the formation of European life and character, human affairs would have been in a worse condition than they now are. Christian morality (so called) has all the characters of a reac- tion; it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than positive ; passive rather than active ; Innocence rather than Noble- ness ; Abstinence from Evil, rather than energetic Pursuit of Good : in its precepts (as has been well said) * thou shalt not' predominates unduly over * thou shalt. ^ In its horror of sensuality, it made an idol of asceticism, which has been gradually compromised away into one of legality. It holds out the hope of heaven and the threat of hell, as the appointed and appropriate motives to a virtuous
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life : in this falling far below the best of the ancients, and doing what lies in it to give to human morality an essentially selfish character, by disconnecting each man's feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow-creatures, except so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him for consulting them. It is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience ; it inculcates submission to all authorities found esta- blished ; who indeed are not to be actively obeyed when they command what religion forbids, but who are not to be resisted, far less rebelled against, for any amount of wrong to ourselves. And while, in the morality of the best Pagan nations, duty to the State holds even a disproportionate place, in- fringing on the just liberty of the individual ; in purely Christian ethics, that grand department of duty is scarcely noticed or acknowledged. It is in the Koran, not the New Testament, that we read the maxim — 'A ruler who appoints any man to an office, when there is in his dominions another man better qualified for it, sins against God and against the State.' What little recognition the idea of obligation to the public obtains in modern morality, is derived from Greek and Roman sources, not from Christian ; as, even in the morality of private life, whatever exists of magnanimity, highmindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honour, is derived from the purely human, not the religious part of owe education, and never could have grown
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oat of a standard of ethics in whicli the only worth, professedly recognised, is that of obedience. I am as far as any one from pretending that these defects are necessarily inherent in the Chris- tian ethics, in every manner in which it can be conceived, or that the many requisites of a com- plete moral doctrine which it does not contain, do not admit of being reconciled with it. Far less would I insinuate this of the doctrines and pre- cepts of Christ himself I believe that the sayings of Christ are all, that I can see any evidence of their having been intended to be ; that they are irreconcilable with nothing which a comprehensive moralityrequires; that everything which is excellent in ethics may be brought within them, with no greater violence to their language than has been done to it by all who have attempted to deduce from them any practical system of conduct what- ever. But it is quite consistent with this, to believe that they contain, and were meant to contain, only a part of the truth ; that many essential elements of the highest morality are among the things which are not provided for, nor intended to be provided for, in the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity, and which have been entirely thrown aside in the system of ethics erected on the basis of those deliverances by the Christian Church. And this being so, I think it a great error to persist in attempting to find in the
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Cliristian doctrine that complete rule for our guid- ance, wMcli its author intended it to sanction and enforce, but ouly partially to provide. I believe, too, that this narrow theory is becoming a grave practical evil, detracting greatly from the value of the moral training and instruction, which so many well-meaning persons are now at length exerting themselves to promote. I much fear that by attempting to form the mind and feelings on an exclusively religious type, and discarding those secular standards (as for want of a better name they may be called) which heretofore co-existed with and supplemented the Christian ethics, receiv- ing some of its spirit, and infusing into it some of theirs, there will result, and is even now resulting, a low, abject, servile type of character, which, submit itself as it may to what it deems the Supreme Will, is incapable of rising to or sympathizing in the conception of Supreme Goodness. I believe that other ethics than any which can be evolved from exclusively Christian sources, must exist side by side with Christian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind ; and that the Christian system is no exception to the rule, that in an im- perfect state of the human mind, the interests of truth require a diversity of opinions. It is not necessary that in ceasing to ignore the moral truths not contained in Christianity, men should ignore any of those which it does contain. Such
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prejudice, or oversight, when it occurs, is altogether an evil ; but it is one from which we cannot hope to be always exempt, and must be regarded as the price paid for an inestimable good. The exclusive pretension made by a part of the truth to be the whole, must and ought to be protested against ; and if a reactionary impulse should make the pro- testors unjust in their turn, this one-sided ness, like the other, may be lamented, but must be tolerated. If Christians would teach infidels to be just to Christianity, they should themselves be just to infidelity. It can do truth no service to blink the fact, known to all who have the most ordinary acquaintance with literary history, that a large portion of the noblest and most valuable moral teaching has been the work, not only of men who did not know, but of men who knew and rejected, the Christian faith.
I do not pretend that the most unlimited use of the freedom of enunciating all possible opinions would put an end to the evils of religious or phi- losophical sectarianism. Every truth which men of narrow capacity are in earnest about, is sure to be asserted, inculcated, and in many ways even acted on, as if no other truth existed in the world, or at all events none that could limit or qualify the first. I acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the freest discussion, but is often heightened and ex-
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acerbated thereby ; the truth which ought to have been, but was not, seen, being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons re- garded as opponents. But it is not on the impas- sioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more dis- interested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. Not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppres- sion of half of it, is the formidable evil ; there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides ; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. And since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial faculty which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of a question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before it, truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to.
We have now recognised the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds ; which we will now briefly reca- pitulate.
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First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, tliat opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.
Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth ; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth ; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly con- tested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little com- prehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the cha- racter and conduct : the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cum- bering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.
Before quitting the subject of freedom of opinion, it is fit to take some notice of those who say, that the free expression of all opinions should be per- mitted, on condition that the manner be temperate,
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and do not pass the bounds of fair discussion. Much might be said on the impossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are to be placed ; for if the test be offence to those whose opinion is attacked, I think experience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is telling and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent. But this, though an important consideration in a practical point of view, merges in a more funda- mental objection. Undoubtedly the manner of asserting an opinion, even though it be a true one, may be very objectionable, and may justly incur severe censure. But the principal offences of the kind are such as it is mostly impossible, unless by accidental self-betrayal, to bring home to convic- tion. The gravest of them is, to argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion. But all this, even to the most aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect good faith, by persons who are not considered, and in many other respects may not deserve to be considered, ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely possible on adequate grounds conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable ; and still less could law presume to interfere with this kind
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of controversial misconduct. With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like, the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the prevailing opinion : against the unpre- vailing they may not only be used without general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righte- ous indignation. Yet whatever mischief arises from their use, is greatest when they are employed against the comparatively defenceless ; and what- ever unfair advantage can be derived by any opinion from this mode of asserting it, accrues almost exclusively to received opinions. The worst offence of this kind which can be committed by a polemic, is to stigmatize those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral men. To calumny of this sort, those who hold any unpopular opinion are peculiarly exposed, because they are in general few and uninfluential, and nobody but themselves feels much interested in seeiog justice done them ; but this weapon is, from the nature of the case, denied to those who attack a prevailing opinion : they can neither use it with safety to themselves, nor, if they could, would it do anything but recoil on their own cause. In general, opinions contrary G
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to those commonly received can only obtain a hearing by studied moderation of language, and the most cautious avoidance of unnecessary offence, from which they hardly ever deviate even in a slight degree without losing ground : while unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of the prevailing opinion, really does deter people from professing contrary opinions, and from listening to those who profess them. For the interest, therefore, of truth and justice, it is far more important to restrain this employment of vituperative language than the other ; and, for example, if it were necessary to choose, ' there would be much more need to dis- courage offensive attacks on infidelity, than on religion. It is, however, obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining either, while opinion ought, in every instance, to deter- mine its verdict by the circumstances of the indi- vidual case ; condemning every one, on whichever side of the argument he places himself, in whose mode of advocacy either want of candour, or malig- nity, bigotry, or intolerance of feeling manifest themselves ; but not inferring these vices from the side which a person takes, though it be the con- trary side of the question to our own : and giving merited honour to every one, whatever opinion he may hold, who has calmness to see and honesty to state what his opponents and their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their discredit, keep-
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ing nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their favour. This is the real morality of public discussion : and if often violated, I am happy to think that there are many controver- sialists who to a great extent observe it, and a still greater number who conscientiously strive towards it.
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CHAPTER III.
OF INDIVIDUALITY, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEING.
^TJCH being the reasons whicli make it impera- tive that human beings should be free to form opinions, and to express their opinions without reserve ; and such the baneful consequences to the intellectual, and through that to the moral nature of man, unless this liberty is either conceded, or asserted in spite of prohibition ; let us next examine whether the same reasons do not require that men should be free to act upon their opinions — to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril. This last pro- viso is of course indispensable. No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive in- stigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corn -dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmo- lested when simply circulated through the press, but
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may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard. Acts, of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the un- favourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited ; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own incli- nation and judgment in things which concern him- self, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost. That mankind are not infallible ; that their truths, for the most part, are only half-truths ; that unity of opinion, unless re- sulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable than at present of recognising all sides of the truth, are principles applicable to men's modes of action, not less than to their opinions. As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living;
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that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others ; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person's own character, but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the prin- cipal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.
In maintaining this principle, the greatest diffi- culty to be encountered does not lie in the appre- ciation of means towards an acknowledged end, but in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself. If it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well- being ; that it is not only a co-ordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilization, in- struction, education, culture, but is itself a neces- sary part and condition of all those things ; there would be no danger that liberty should be under- valued, and the adjustment of the boundaries be- tween it and social control would present no extra- ordinary difficulty. But the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognised by the common modes of thinking, as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account. The majority, being satisfied with the ways of mankind
THE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEING. 103
as they now are (for it is they who make them what they are), cannot comprehend why those ways should not be good enough for everybody ; and what is more, spontaneity forms no part of the ideal of the majority of moral and social reformers, but is rather looked on with jealousy, as a trouble- some and perhaps rebellious obstruction to the general acceptance of what these reformers, in their own judgment, think would be best for man- kind. Few persons, out of Germany, even compre- hend the meaning of the doctrine which Wilhelm Von Humboldt, so eminent both as a savant and as a politician, made the text of a treatise — that c the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole ,' that, therefore, the object ' towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially those who design to influence their fellow-men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development -,' that for this there are two requisites, * freedom, and variety of situations ;' and that from the union of these arise ' individual vigour and manifold diver- sity,' which combine themselves in ' originality.'*
* The Sphere and Duties of Government^ from the German of Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, pp. 11-13.
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Little, however, as people are accustomed to a doctrine like that of Yon Humboldt, and surprising as it may be to them to find so high a value attached to individuality, the question, one must nevertheless think, can only be one of degree. No one's idea of excellence iu conduct is that' people should do absolutely nothing but copy one another. No one would assert that people ought not to put into their mode of life, and into the conduct of their concerns, any impress whatever of their own judg- ment, or of their own individual character. On the other hand, it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it ; as if experience had as yet done nothing to- wards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct, is preferable to another. Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth, as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of human experience. But it is the privi- lege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances and character. The traditions and customs of other people are, to a certain extent, evidence of what their experience has taught them; presumptive evidence, and as such, have a claim to his defe-
THE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEING. 105
rence : but, in the first place, their experience may be too narrow ; or they may not have interpreted it rightly. Secondly, their interpretation of experience may be correct, but unsuitable to him. Customs are made for customary circumstances, and custom- ary characters ; and his circumstances or his charac- ter may be uncustomary. Thirdly, though the customs be both good as customs, and suitable to him, yet to conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or develop in him any of the quali- ties which are the distinctive endowment of a human being. The human faculties of perception, judg- ment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice. He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discernino: or in desirino^ what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used. The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing only because others believe it. If the grounds of an opinion are not conclusive to the person's own reason, his reason cannot be strengthened, but is likely to be weakened, by his adopting it : and if the inducements to an act are not such as are con- sentaneous to his own feelings and character (where affection, or the rights of others, are not concerned) it is so much done towards rendering his feelings
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and character inert and torpid, instead of active and energetic.
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to de- cide, and when he has decided, firmness and self- control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one. It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way, without any of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human being ? It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself. Sup- posing it were possible to get houses built, corn grown, battles fought, causes tried, and even churches erected and prayers said, by machinery — by automatons in human form — it would be a consi- derable loss to exchange for these automatons even the men and women who at present inhabit the
THE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEING. 107
more civilized parts of the world, and who assuredly are but starved specimens of what nature can and will produce. Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develope itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.
It will probably be conceded that it is desirable people should exercise their understandings, and that an intelligent following of custom, or even occasionally an intelligent deviation from custom, is better than a blind and simply mechanical adhe- sion to it. To a certain extent it is admitted, that our understanding should be our own : but there is not the same willingness to admit that our desires and impulses should be our own likewise ; or that to possess impulses of our own, and of any strength, is anything but a peril and a snare. Yet desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being, as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced ; when one set of aims and inclinations is developed into strength, while others, which ought to co-exist with them, remain weak and inactive. It is not because men's desires are strong that they act ill ; it is because their consciences are weak. There is no natural connexion between strong im- pulses and a weak conscience. The natural con-
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nexion is the other way. To say that one person's desires and feelings are stronger and more various than those of another, is merely to say that he has more of the raw material of human nature, and is therefore capable, perhaps of more evil, but certainly of more good. Strong impulses are but another name for energy. Energy may be turned to bad uses ; but more good may always be made of an energetic nature, than of an indolent and impassive one. Those who have most natural feeling, are always those whose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest. The same strong susceptibilities which make the personal impulses vivid and powerful, are also the source from whence are generated the most passionate love of virtue, and the sternest self-control. It is through the cultivation of these, that society both does its duty and protects its interests : not by rejecting the stuff of which heroes are made, because it knows not how to make them. A person whose desires and impulses are his own — are the expression of his own nature, as it has been deve- loped and modified by his own culture — is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character. If, in addition to being his own, his impulses are strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he has an enerojetic character. Whoever thinks that indi-
THE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEIXG. 109
vidnality of desires and impulses should not be encouraged to unfold itself, must maintain that society has no need of strong natures — is not the better for containing many persons who have much character — and that a high general average of energy is not desirable.
In some early states of society, these forces might be, and were, too much ahead of the power which society then possessed of disciplining and con- trolling them. There has been a time when the element of spontaneity and individuality was in excess, and the social principle had a hard struggle with it. The difficulty then was, to induce men of strong bodies or minds to pay obedience to any rules which required them to control their impulses. To overcome this difficulty, law and discipline, like the Popes struggling against the Emperors, asserted a power over the whole man, claiming to control all his life in order to control his character — which society had not found any other sufficient means of binding. But society has now fairly got the better of individuality ; and the danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences. Things are vastly changed, since the passions of those who were strong by station or by personal endowment were in a state of habitual rebellion against laws and ordinances^ and required to be rigorously chained up to enable the persons within their reach to enjoy
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any particle of security. In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, every one lives as under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. Not only in what concerns others, but in what concerns only themselves, the individual or the family do not ask themselves — what do I prefer? or, what would suit my character and dis- position ? or, what would allow the best and highest in me to have fair play, and enable it to grow and thrive ? They ask themselves, what is suitable to my position ? what is usually done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances ? or (worse still) what is usually done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine? I do not mean that they choose what is customary, in pre- ference to what suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke : even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they like in crowds; they exercise choice only amoDcr things commonly done : peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with crimes : until by dint of not following their own nature, they have no nature to follow : their human capacities are withered and starved : they become incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally without either opinions or feel- ings of home growth, or properly their own. Now
THE ELEMENTS OP WELL-BEING. Ill
is this, or is it not, the desirable condition of human nature ?
It is so, on the Calvinistic theory. According to that, the one great offence of man is self-will. All the good of which humanity is capable, is com- prised in obedience. You have no choice ; thus you must do, and no otherwise : ' whatever is not a duty, is a sin.' Human nature being radically corrupt, there is no redemption for any one until human nature is killed within him. To one hold- ing this theory of life, crushing out any of the human faculties, capacities, and susceptibilities, is no evil : man needs no capacity, but that of sur- rendering himself to the will of God : and if he uses any of his faculties for any other purpose but to do that supposed will more effectually, he is better without them. This is the theory of Cal- vinism ; and it is held, in a mitigated form, by many who do not consider themselves Calvinists ; the mitigation consisting in giving a less ascetic interpretation to the alleged will of God ; asserting it to be his will that mankind should gratify some of their inclinations; of course not in the manner they themselves prefer, but in the way of obedi- ence, that is, in a way prescribed to them by authority; and, therefore, by the necessary condi- tions of the case, the same for all.
In some such insidious form there is at present a strong tendency to this narrow theory of life, and
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to the pinched and hidebound type of human cha- racter which it patronizes. Many persons, no doubt, sincerely think that human beings thus cramped and dwarfed, are as their Maker designed them to be ; just as many have thought that trees are a much finer thing when chpped into pollards, or cut out into figures of animals, than as nature made them. But if it be any part of religion to believe that man was made by a good Being, it is more consistent with that faith to believe, that this Being gave all human faculties that they might be cultivated and unfolded, not rooted out and con- sumed, and that he takes delight in every nearer approach made by his creatures to the ideal con- ception embodied in them, every increase in any of their capabilities of comprehension, of action, or of enjoyment. There is a different type of human excellence from the Calvinistic ; a conception of humanity as having its nature bestowed on it for other purposes than merely to be abnegated. 'Pasfan self-assertion ' is one of the elements of human worth, as well as ' Christian self-denial.'* There is a Greek ideal of self- development, which the Platonic and Christian ideal of self-government blends with, but does not supersede. It may be better to be a John Knox than an Alcibiades, but it is better to be a Pericles than either ; nor w^ould a Pericles, if we had one in ^ these days, * Sterling's Essays.
THE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEING. 113
be without anything good which belonged to John Knox.
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contempla- tion ; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, fur- nishino^ more abundant aliment to hidi thouo^hts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fulness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them. As much compression is as necessary to prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with ; but for this there is ample com- pensation even in the point of view of human de- velopment. The means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of the development of
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114. OF INDIVIDUALITY; AS ONE OF
other people. And even to himself there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, deve- lopes the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere displeasure, developes nothing valuable, except such force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint. If acquiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole nature. To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives. In pro- portion as this latitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to posterity. Even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as individuality exists under it ; and whatever crushes individuality is despotism, by whatever name it maybe called, and whether it professes to be enforcing the will of God or the injunctions of men. Having said that Individuality is the same thing with development, and that it is only the cultiva- tion of individuality which produces, or can pro- duce, well- developed human beings, I might here close the argument : for what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human beings themselves neiirer to the best thing they can be ? or what worse can be
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said of any obstruction to good, than that it pre- vents this ? Doubtless, however, these considera- tions will not suffice to convince those who most need convincing ; and it is necessary further to show, that these developed human beings are of some use to the undeveloped — to point out to those who do not desire liberty, and would not avail themselves of it, that they may be in some intelli- gible manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it without hindrance.
In the first place, then^ I would suggest that they might possibly learn something from them. It will not be denied by anybody, that originality is a valuable element in human affairs. There is always need of persons not only to discover new truths, and point out when what were once truths are true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and set the example of more enlightened conduct, and better taste and sense in human life. This cannot well be gainsaid by anybody who does not believe that the world has already attained perfection in all its ways and practices. It is true that this benefit is not capable of being rendered by everybody alike : there are but few persons, in comparison with the whole of mankind, whose experiments, if adojDted by others, would be likely to be any im- provement on established practice. But these few are the salt of the earth ; without them, human life w^ould become a stagnant pool. Not only is it h2
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they who introduce good things which did not before exist ; it is they who keep the life in those which already existed. If there were nothing new to be done, would human intellect cease to be ne- cessary ? Would it be a reason why those who do the old things should forget why they are done, and do them like cattle, not like human beings ? There is only too great a tendency in the best beliefs and practices to degenerate into the me- chanical ; and unless there were a succession of persons whose ever-recurring originality prevents the grounds of those beliefs and practices from becoming merely traditional, such dead matter would not resist the smallest shock from anything really alive, and there would be no reason why civilization should not die out, as in the Byzantine Empire. Persons of genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority ; but in order to have them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow. Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom. Persons of genius are, ex vi termini, more individual than any other people — less capable, consequently, of fitting themselves, without hurtful compression, into any of the small number of moulds which society pro- vides in order to save its members the trouble of forming their own character. If from timidity they consent to be forced into one of these moulds, and to let all that part of themselves which cannot ex-
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pand under the pressure remain unexpanded, society will be little the better for their genius. If they are of a strong character, and break their fetters, they become a mark for the society which has not succeeded in reducing them to common- place, to point at with solemn warning as ' wild/ * erratic,' and the like ; much as if one should complain of the Niagara river for not flowing smoothly between its banks like a Dutch canal.
I insist thus emphatically on the importance of genius, and the necessity of allowing it to unfold itself freely both in thought and in practice, being well aware that no one will deny the position in theory, but knowing also that almost every one, in reality, is totally indifferent to it. People think genius a fine thing if it enables a man to write an exciting poem, or paint a picture. But in its true sense, that of originality in thought and actioD, though no one says that it is not a thing to be admired, nearly all, at heart, think that they can do very well without it. Unhappily this is too natural to be wondered at. Originality is the one thino: which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of. They cannot see what it is to do for them : how should they ? If they could see what it would do for them, it would not be originality. The first service which originality has to render them, is that of opening their eyes : which being
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once fully done, they would have a chance of being themselves original. Meanwhile, recollecting that nothing was ever yet done which some one was not the first to do, and that all good things which exist are the fruits of originality, let them be modest enough to believe that there is something still left for it to accomplish, and assure themselves that they are more in need of originality, the less they are conscious of the want.
In sober truth, whatever homage may be pro- fessed, or even paid, to real or supposed mental superiority, the general tendency of things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind. In ancient history, io the middle ages, and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time, the individual was a power in himself ; and if he had either great talents or a high social position, he was a considerable power. At present individuals are lost in the crowd. In politics it is almost a triviality to say that public opinion now rules the world. The ouly power deserving the name is that of masses, and of go- vernments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses. This is as true in the moral and social relations of private life as in pubhc transactions. Those whose opi- nions go by the name of public opinion, are not always the same sort of public : in America they
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are the whole white population; in England, chiefly the middle class. But they are always a mass, that is to say, collective mediocrity. And what is a still greater novelty, the mass do not now take their opinions from dignitaries in Church or State, from ostensible leaders, or from books. Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers. I am not complaining of all this. I do not assert that anything better is compatible, as a general rule, with the present low state of the human mind. But that does not hinder the government of mediocrity from being mediocre go- vernment. No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they always have done) by the counsels and influ- ence of a more highly gifted and instructed One or Few. The initiation of all wise or noble things, comes and must come from individuals ; generally at first from some one individual. The honour and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative ; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes open. I am not countenancing
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the sort of 'hero-worship' which applauds the strong man of genius for forcibly seizing on the government of the world and making it do his bidding in spite of itself. All he can claim is, freedom to point out the way. The power of compelling others into it, is not only inconsistent with the freedom and development of all the rest, but corrupting to the strong man himself. It does seem, however, that when the opinions of masses of merely average men are everywhere become or becoming the dominant power, the counterpoise and corrective to that tendency would be, the more and more pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought. It is in these circumstances most especially, that excep- tional individuals, instead of being deterred, should be encouraged in acting differently from the mass. In other times there was no advantage in their doing so, unless they acted not only differently, but better. In this age, the mere example of non- conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service. Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric. Eccentricity has always abounded when and where strength of character has abounded ; and the amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to the
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amount of genius, mental vigour, and moral cou- rage which it contained. That so few now dare to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the time. •
I have said that it is important to give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in order that it may in time appear which of these are fit to be converted into customs. But inde- pendence of action, and disregard of custom, are not solely deserving of encouragement for the the chance they afford that better modes of action, and customs more worthy of general adoption, may be struck out; nor is it only persons of decided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry on their lives in their own way. There is no reason that all human existence should be con- structed on some one or some small number of patterns. If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode. Human beings are not like sheep ; and even sheep are not undistinguishably alike. A man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to fit him, unless they are either made to his measure, or he has a whole warehouseful to choose from : and is it easier to fit him with a life than with a coat, or are human beings more like one another in their whole physical and spiritual conformation
12a OF INDIVIDUALITY, AS ONE Ol'
than in the shape of their feet ? If it were only that people have diversities of taste, that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them all after one model. But different persons also require different conditions for their spiritual develop- ment; and can no more exist healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can in the same physical, atmosphere and climate. The same things which are helps to one person towards the cultivation of his higher nature, are hin- drances to another. The same mode of life is a healthy excitement to one, keeping all his facul- ties of action and enjoyment in their best order, while to another it is a distracting burthen, which suspends or crushes all internal life. Such are the differences amonof human beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a corre- sponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable. Why then should tolerance, as far as the public sentiment is concerned, extend only to tastes and modes of life which extort acquiescence by the multitude of their adherents? Nowhere (except in some monastic institutions) is diversity of taste entirely unrecognised ; a person may, without blame,
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either like or dislike rowing, or smoking, or music, or athletic exercises, or chess, or cards, or study, because both those who like each of these things, and those who dislike them, are too numerous to be put down. But the man, and still more the woman, who can be accused either of doing * what nobody does,' or of not doing ' what everybody does,' is the subject of as much depreciatory remark as if he or she had committed some grave moral delinquency. Persons require to possess a title, or some other badge of rank, or of the considera- tion of people of rank, to be able to indulge somewhat in the luxury of doing as they like without detriment to their estimation. To in- dulge somewhat, I repeat : for whoever allow themselves much of that indulgence, incur the risk of something worse than disparaging speeches — they are in peril of a commission cle luncoticOj and of having their property taken from them and given to their relations.*
* There is something both contemptible and frightful in the sort of evidence on which, of late years, any person can be judicially declared unfit for the management of his afiairs ; and after his death, his disposal of his property can be set aside, if there is enough of it to pay the expenses of litigation — which are charged on the property itself. All the minute details of his daily life are pried into, and whatever is found which, seen through the medium of the perceiving and describing faculties of the lowest of the low, bears an appearance unlike absolute com- monplace, is laid before the jury as evidence of insanity, and often with success ; the jurors being little, if at all, less vulgar and ignorant than the witnesses ; while the judges, with that
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There is one characteristic of the present direc- tion of public opinion, peculiarly calculated to make it intolerant of any marked demonstration of individuality. The general average of mankind are not only moderate in intellect, but also mode- rate in inclinations : they have no tastes or wishes strong enough to incline them to do anything unusual, and they consequently do not understand those who have, and class all such with the wild and intemperate whom they are accustomed to look down upon. Now, in addition to this fact which is general, we have only to suppose that a strong movement has set in towards the improve- ment of morals, and it is evident what we have to expect. In these days such a movement has set in ; much has actually been effected in the way of increased regularity of conduct, and discourage-
extraordinary want of knowledge of human nature and life which continually astonishes us in English lawyers, often help to mislead them. These trials speak volumes as to the state of feeUng and opinion among the vulgar with regard to human liberty. So far from setting any value on individuality — so far from respecting the right of each individual to act, in things indifferent, as seems good to his own judgment and inclinations, judges and juries cannot even conceive that a person in a state of sanity can desire such freedom. In former days, when it was proposed to bum atheists, charitable people used to suggest putting them in a madhouse instead : it would be nothing sur- prising now-a-days were we to see this done, and the doers applauding themselves, because, instead of persecuting for reli- gion, they had adopted so humane and Christian a mode of treat- ing these unfortunates, not without a silent satisfaction at their having thereby obtained their deserts.
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ment of excesses ; and there is a philanthropic spirit abroad, for the exercise of which there is no more inviting field than the moral and prudential improvement of our fellow-creatures. These tendencies of the times cause the public to be more disposed than at most former periods to prescribe general rules of conduct, and endea- vour to make every one conform to the approved standard. And that standard, express or tacit, is to desire nothing strongly. Its ideal of character is to be without any marked character ; to maim by compression, like a Chinese lady's foot, every part of human nature which stands out promi- nently, and tends to make the person markedly dissimilar in outline to commonplace humanity.
As is usually the case with ideals which exclude one-half of what is desirable, the present standard of approbation produces only an inferior imitation of the other half. Instead of great energies guided by vigorous reason, and strong feelings strongly controlled by a conscientious will, its result is weak feelings and weak energies, which therefore can be kept in outward conformity to rule without any strength either of will or of reason. Already energetic characters on any large scale are becoming merely traditional. There is now scarcely any outlet for energy in this country except business. The energy expended in this may still be regarded as considerable. What little
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is left from that employment, is expended on some hobby; which may be a useful, even a philan- thropic hobby, but is always some one thing, and generally a thing of small dimensions. The great- ness of England is now all collective : individually small, we only appear capable of anything great by our habit of combining; and with this our moral and religious philanthropists are perfectly contented. But it was men of another stamp than this that made England what it has been ; and men of another stamp will be needed to pre- vent its decline.
The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement. The spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people ; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of im- provement ; but the only unfailing and perma- nent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals. The pro- gressive principle, however, in either shape, whe- ther as the love of liberty or of improvement, is
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antagonistic to the sway of Custom, involving at least emancipation from that yoke ; and the con- test between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind. The greater part of the world has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of Custom is complete. This is the case over the whole East. Custom is there, in all things, the final appeal ; justice and right mean conformity to custom ; the argument of custom no one, unless some tyrant intoxicated with powei^^ thinks of resisting. And we see the result. Those nations must once have had originality ; they did not start out of the ground populous, lettered, and versed in many of the arts of life ; they made themselves all this, and were then the greatest and most powerful nations of the world. What are they now? The subjects or dependents of tribes whose forefathers wandered in the forests when theirs had magnificent palaces and gorgeous temples, but over whom custom exercised only a divided rule with liberty and progress. A people, it appears, may be progressive for a certain length of time, and then stop : when does it stop ? When it ceases to possess individuality. If a similar change should befall the nations of Europe, it will not be in exactly the same shape : the despotism of custom with which these nations are threatened is not precisely stationariness. It proscribes singularity, but it does not preclude
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change, provided all change together. We have discarded the fixed costumes of our forefathers; every one must still dress like other people, but the fashion may change once or twice a year. We thus take care that when there is change, it shall be for change's sake, and not from any idea of beauty or convenience ; for the same idea of beauty or convenience would not strike all the world at the same moment, and be simultaneously thrown aside by all at another moment. But we are progressive as well as changeable : we continually make new inventions in mechanical things, and keep them until they are again superseded by better ; we are eager for improvement in politics, in education, even in morals, though in this last our idea of im- provement chiefly consists in persuading or forcing other people to be as good as ourselves. It is not progress that we object to ; on the contrary, we flatter ourselves that we are the most progressive people who ever lived. It is individuality that we war against : we should think we had done won- ders if we had made ourselves all alike ; forgetting that the unlikeness of one person to another is generally the first thing which draws the attention of either to the imperfection of his own type, and the superiority of another, or the possibility, by combining the advantages of both, of producing something better than either. We have a warning example in China — a nation of much talent, and,
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in some respects, even wisdom, owing to the rare good fortune of having been provided at an early period with a particularly good set of customs, the work, in some measure, of men to whom even the most enlightened European must accord, under certain limitations, the title of sages and philoso- phers. They are remarkable, too, in the excel- lence of their apparatus for impressing, as far as possible, the best wisdom they possess upon every mind in the community, and securing that those who have appropriated most of it shall occupy the posts of honour and power. Surely the people who did this have discovered the secret of human progressiveness, and must have kept themselves steadily at the head of the movement of the world. On the contrary, they have become stationary- have remained so for thousands of years ; and if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners. They have succeeded beyond all hope in what English philanthropists are so indus- triously working at — in making a people all alike, all governing their thoughts and conduct by the same maxims and rules ; and these are the fruits. The modern regime of public opinion is, in an unorganized form, what the Chinese educational and political systems are in an organized ; and unless individuality shall be able successfully to assert itself against this yoke, Europe, notwith- I
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standing its noble antecedents and its professed Christianity, will tend to become another China.
What is it that has hitherto preserved Europe from this lot? What has made the European family of nations an improving, instead of a sta- tionary portion of mankind ? Not any superior excellence in them, which, when it exists, exists as the effect, not as the cause ; but their remarkable diversity of character and culture. Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another : they have struck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable ; and although at every period those who travelled in different paths have been intolerant of one an- other, and each would have thought it an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel his road, their attempts to thwart each other's development have rarely had any permanent success, and each has in time endured to receive the good which the others have offered. Europe is, in my judgment, wholly indebted to this plu- rality of paths for its progressive and many-sided development. But it already begins to possess this benefit in a considerably less degree. It is decidedly advancing towards the Chinese ideal of making all people alike. M. de Tocqueville, in his last important work, remarks how much more the Frenchmen of the present day resemble one another, than did those even of the last generation.
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The same remark miglit be made of Englishmen in a far greater degree. In a passage already quoted from Wilhelm von Humboldt, he points out two things as necessary conditions of human develop- ment, because necessary to render peoiole unlike one another ; namely, freedom, and variety of situations. The second of these two conditions is in this country every day diminishing. The circumstances which surround different classes and individuals, and shape their characters, are daily becoming more assimilated. Formerly, different ranks, different neighbourhoods, different trades and professions, lived in what might be called dif- ferent worlds ; at present, to a great degree in the same. Comparatively speaking, they now read the same things, listen lo the same things, see the same things, go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed to the same objects, have the same rights and liberties, and the same means of assert- ing them. Great as are the differences of position which remain, they are nothing to those which have ceased. And the assimilation is still proceeding. All the political changes of the age promote it, since they all tend to raise the low and to lower the high. Every extension of education promotes it, because education brings people under common in- fluences, and gives them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments. Improvements in the means of communication promote it, by bringing l2
1S2 OF INDIVIDUALITY, AS ONE OF
the inhabitants of distant places into personal con- tact, and keeping up a rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another. The in- crease of commerce and manufactures promotes it, by diffusing more widely the advantages of easy circumstances, and opening all objects of ambition, even the highest, to general competition, whereby the desire of rising becomes no longer the character of a particular class, but of all classes. A more powerful agency than even all these, in bringing about a general similarity among mankind, is the complete establishment, in this and other free countries, of the ascendancy of public opinion in the State. As the various social eminences which enabled persons entrenched on them to disregard the opinion of the multitude, gradually become levelled ; as the very idea of resisting the will of the public, when it is positively known that they have a will, disappears more and more from the minds of practical politicians ; there ceases to be any social support for nonconformity — any substan- tive power in society, which, itself opposed to the ascendancy of numbers, is interested in taking under its protection opinions and tendencies at variance with those of the public.
The combination of all these causes forms so great a mass of influences hostile to Individuality, that it is not easy to see how it can stand its ground. It will do so with increasing difficulty^
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unless the intelligent part of the public can be made to feel its value — to see that it is good there should be differences, even though not for the better, even though, as it may appear to them, some should be for the worse. If the claims of Individuality are ever to be asserted, the time is now, while much is still wanting to complete the enforced assimilation. It is only in the earlier stages that any stand can be successfully made against the en- croachment. The demand that all other people shall resemble ourselves, grows by what it feeds on. If resistance waits till life is reduced nearly to one uniform type, all deviations from that type will come to be considered impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. Mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it.
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LnnTS TO THE AUTHOEITY OF
CHAPTER IT.
I
OF THE LDITTS TO THE AUTHORITY OF SOCIETY OVER THE rSTDITIDUAL.
I IT HAT, then, is the rightful limit to the sove. ' ' reignty of the individual over himself? "Where does the authority of society begin ? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society ?
Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more particulariy concerns it To indi- viduality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested ; to society, the part which chiefly interests society.
Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by in- venting a contract in order to deduce social oblicra- tions from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists first, in not injuring the interests of one another ; or rather certain interests, which, either by ex- press legal provision or by tacit unders-tanding,